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ABSTRACT
DETERMINANTS OF TAX EFFORT: A CROSS COUNTRY ANALYSIS
by Mark Alan McCoon
May 2012
This paper analyzes the determinants of tax effort. Tax effort is defined as the
aggregate tax level of a country divided by its Gross Domestic Product. A country‘s tax
effort is an expression of the tax burden the government imposes on the economy. One
of the most fundamental issues confronting a society is the size of the governmental
sector. How large should the government be relative to the size of the economy? The
nations of the world have crafted many different answers to that question as evidenced by
the fact that tax effort and the size of government sectors varies widely. At the low tax
extreme countries such as Guatemala can have tax efforts as low as ten percent of GDP
while at the other extreme high tax countries such as Sweden have tax efforts in excess of
fifty percent of GDP (World Bank 2010). While part of the variation in tax effort and the
size of government among countries has been explained, much remains unexplained. The
extent to which national cultural attributes as determined by Hofstede (2005) and the
World Values Survey (2010) affect total tax levels is explored in this paper. In other
words, this paper answers the question: does culture affect total tax effort and the size of
the governmental sector? This research contributes to the literature by explaining more
of the difference in tax effort among nations and by expanding our understanding of why
some countries are high tax states and others are low tax states.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This paper analyzes the determinants of tax effort. Tax effort is defined as the
aggregate tax level of a country divided by its Gross Domestic Product. A country‘s tax
effort is an expression of the tax burden the government imposes on the economy. The
extent to which national cultural attributes as determined by Hofstede (2001) and the
World Values Survey (2010) affect total tax levels is explored. The research question
this paper addresses is: does culture affect total tax effort and the size of the
governmental sector?
One of the most fundamental issues confronting a society is the size of the
governmental sector. How large should the government be relative to the size of the
economy? The nations of the world have crafted many different answers to that question
as evidenced by the fact that the size of government sectors varies widely. Likewise, the
size of the governmental sector can vary during different time periods even within the
same society, although generally the size of a country‘s governmental sector appears
relatively fixed as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product. Indeed patterns in relative
government size in Europe and the Americas observed by Tocqueville (2003) nearly two
centuries ago are still apparent today.
Tax effort and the size of government are important, they matter. It has been
recognized at least since Adam Smith (2009) that excessive taxation can be detrimental to
the economy. Smith (2009) observed that taxation which is too high is self defeating.
Optimal tax theory advocates a tax system which imposes as small a tax burden as
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possible which meets the legitimate needs of government and maximizes the social
welfare of society (Slemrod 1990).
Endogenous Growth Theory holds that fiscal and tax policy affects long run
economic growth (Rebelo 1991). According to Barro (1990) increases in taxation and
government spending have two effects on growth. The increase in taxation reduces
growth because of the disincentive effects of taxation while the increase in government
spending raises the marginal productivity of capital and increases growth (Barro 1990).
Gains from government spending tend to outweigh losses from taxation when
government is small, according to Barro (1990), while the opposite is true when
government is large. Guider (2007) concurs, finding that government size beyond its
optimal economic enhancing point, is growth inhibiting. Scully (1994) finds that
government spending beyond twenty percent of gross domestic product to be
counterproductive from an economic perspective. Tax effort which is too low leads to
weak and unstable governments which are too weak to enforce their own laws. At the
extreme, anarchy can result in such situations with weak underfunded governments. This
was a concern of political philosopher Thomas Hobbes (2009). Hobbes, the originator of
social contract theory, advocates strong governmental authority to safeguard against
disharmony. Man‘s natural state, according to Hobbes (2009, xviii) is conflict; a ―war of
all against all,‖ which only a strong government can prevent. In a similar vein North
(1991) contends that the rule of law is fundamental to laying the foundation for economic
development.
All governments need sufficient revenue in order to function properly.
Governments of developing nations need additional revenue in order to build much
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needed infrastructure while the governments of many developed countries need
additional revenue in order to meet ever mounting social welfare obligations. The
governments of Latin American countries, for example are almost without exception
chronically and materially underfunded. Indeed, Bird, Martinez-Vazquez, and Togler
(2008) contend the situation has persisted for half a century at least. Significantly less tax
revenue is collected by countries in the region compared to the rest of the world
(DataGov 2010). This leads to a vicious circle in that an underfunded government is a
weak government and a weak government has less ability to enforce its own laws
including the collection of tax revenues. Less tax revenue in turn leads to greater
weakness.
There exists a wide variation in total tax levels among countries. At the low tax
extreme countries such as Guatemala can have tax efforts as low as ten percent of GDP
while at the other extreme high tax countries such as Sweden have tax efforts in excess of
fifty percent of GDP (World Bank 2010). Even among OECD nations, substantial
variation exists, as tax effort among some countries such as Denmark is twice that of
others, such as South Korea (OECD 2009). This paper explains the basis for such
dramatic variation. Clearly income is part of the explanation with higher income
countries generally having higher tax efforts than lower income countries. In this respect
tax effort, and by implication the government sector, acts as a luxury good in that when
income increases the size of the government sector increases, in absolute and in relative
terms. The demand for luxury goods increase by a greater percentage than income
increases.
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The main motivation of this study is to consider the affects of national culture on
tax effort. While part of the variation in tax effort and the size of government among
countries has been explained, much remains unexplained. This research contributes to
the literature by explaining more of that difference and by expanding our understanding
of why some countries are high tax states and others are low tax states.
The objective of this paper is to test hypotheses that certain aspects of national
culture affect tax effort and the size of government. More specifically the objective of
this paper is to test the hypothesis that countries with high individualism and collectivism
have high tax effort and government spending and also to test the hypothesis that
countries with low masculinity and femininity have high tax effort and government
spending. Additional objectives are to test the hypothesis that low power distance is
associated with high tax effort and government spending and also to test the hypothesis
that high uncertainty avoidance is associated with high tax effort and high government
spending.
Individualism and collectivism relate to the power of the group within society. In
collectivist societies the loyalty is to the family, clan, or tribe and not to the nation, or
society at large. The opposite is true in individualist societies where loyalty is to society.
Masculinity and femininity relates to traditional gender roles. Masculine societies have
more clearly defined gender roles with men being strong, assertive, and driven by
achievement and material success while women are modest, caring, and concerned with
quality of life. Power distance relates to the manner in which societies deal with human
inequality. Societies with higher power distance scores have greater distance between
classes while those with lower power distance are more egalitarian. Uncertainty
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avoidance relates to the manner in which a society copes with the uncertainties of life.
Societies with high levels of uncertainty avoidance have many rules and regulations, both
formal and informal for dealing with an unpredictable and uncertain future (Hofstede
2001).
A further objective is to test the cultural dimensions observed by Inglehart and
Welzel (2005) from World Values Survey (2010) data, specifically to test the hypothesis
that countries with high scores on the traditional versus secular rational cultural
dimension have high tax effort and government spending and also to test the hypothesis
that countries with high levels on the survivalist versus self expression cultural dimension
have high tax effort and government spending. Testing the World Values Survey cultural
dimensions will be done in order to confirm the findings observed from the Hofstede
cultural variable tests.
The traditional versus secular rational dimension reflects the importance of
traditional beliefs to society. Strongly traditional societies are deferential to authority,
view religion as very important in their lives, have strong family ties with well defined
roles, are nationalistic, and have limited tolerance for others. Societies which have high
secular rational values are less deferential to authority, view religion as less important,
are less nationalistic, and have greater tolerance for others. The survivalist versus self
expression cultural dimension reflects the transition from industrial society to postindustrial or knowledge society. In industrial societies, the emphasis is on economic and
physical security while in knowledge societies, the emphasis shifts to individual well
being, self expression, and the quality of life. Countries with high self expression values
place a strong emphasis on participation in political and economic decision making,
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gender equality, and individual freedoms and are generally tolerant of other cultures
(Inglehart & Welzel 2005).
Stated formally, the alternative or research hypotheses are as follows:
H1: There is a direct relationship between Individualism and collectivism and tax
effort.
H2: There is a direct relationship between Masculinity and femininity and tax
effort.
H3: There is a direct relationship between Power Distance and tax effort.
H4: There is a direct relationship between Uncertainty Avoidance and tax effort.
H5: There is a direct relationship between Traditional versus Secular Rational
values and tax effort.
H6: There is a direct relationship between Survivalist versus Self Expression
values and tax effort.
Tsakumis, Curatola, and Porcano (2007) are the first to utilize Hofstede‘s cultural
framework in an analysis of tax policy differences among nations. The authors find that
the variation in tax evasion among countries is indeed related to Hofstede‘s cultural
framework. In other words, culture matters at the national level at least with respect to
tax evasion. Richardson (2008) in an expanded study also finds that culture matters at the
national level with respect to tax evasion.
Pooled least squares regression is utilized to empirically test the main hypotheses
of the study. Pooled least squares regression is appropriate whenever independently
sampled cross sections are obtained from large populations at different points in time
(Wooldridge 2006). Since the World Values Survey (2010) is conducted in such a
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manner, pooled least squares is appropriate. Likewise, for comparative purposes, the
Hofstede (2001) cultural dimensions are analyzed utilizing the same methodology.
This paper proceeds as follows; following the Introduction, Chapter Two consists
of a review of the related literature. Included in Chapter Two is the theoretical
foundation for the study. Chapter Three details the data, variables, and hypotheses
utilized, while the following chapter, Chapter Four, reports the statistical methods used
and results of the analysis. Finally, Section Five is a brief Conclusion. Included in the
conclusion is a discussion of the limitations of the study as well as suggestions for further
research.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE RELATED LITERATURE
This chapter proceeds as follows: the first section is a discussion of tax effort and
the closely related size of government. Included in this section are a number of studies
related to known or hypothesized determinants of tax effort. Relying mostly on the work
of Geertz (1973) and Hofstede (2001), the following section defines culture as it is used
in this paper. Hofstede‘s (2001) cultural dimensions are the subject of the next section,
followed by a section describing modernization theory. Modernization theory provides a
theoretical foundation for the use of national cultural variables. The relationship between
culture and economics is covered in the next section which is followed by a section
discussing the relationship between culture and taxation. A brief discussion of optimal
taxation is the subject of the next section. The chapter concludes with a brief summary of
the theoretical foundation for the paper.
Tax Effort and the Size of Government
Fairly extensive literature exists regarding the size of government. Alesina and
Spolaore (1997) contend that country size is the primary determinate of the size of
government. Smaller countries in terms of population have larger governments in
relative terms when measured as a percentage of GDP. This finding confirms the
assumption that there are fixed costs associated with government.
A country‘s state of development has long been recognized as having a significant
effect on the size of the governmental sector. More developed countries and countries
with higher per capita income have larger tax efforts (total tax collected divided by GDP)
and have larger governments in relative as well as in absolute terms. Further, as a
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country develops and its per capita income increases, the relative size of its government
increases as well. This phenomenon is referred to as Wagner‘s Law after the German
economist Adolph Wagner, who developed the theory in the 1880‘s (Tullock 1993).
Wagner‘s Law has been largely confirmed by the historical development of Europe
(Meltzer & Richard 1981) and the United States (North & Wallis 1982), although Tullock
(1993) cautions that there have been significant periods of time when economic
development occurred which lack the predicted increase in government.
Trade openness is also thought by many to have an effect on the size of
government (Cameron 1978). Although Alesina and Waciarg (1998) note the
interconnectedness of trade openness and government size, they are reluctant to proclaim
cause and effect. Rodrik (1998) has no such reluctance; he argues that trade openness
results in larger government. According to Rodrik countries which are open to
international trade are subject to external shocks, and accordingly, need larger
governmental sectors to compensate. Rodrik finds a correlation between trade openness
and the size of government which is not sensitive to changes in the measure of
government size and applies to both high and low income countries (Rodrik 1998). In a
contrary viewpoint, Benarroch and Panday (2008) utilize panel data and find no
relationship between trade openness and government size and Ferris (2003) cautions
about the use of alternative measures of the size of government.
Cameron (1978) shows that the level of trade openness in 1960 of OECD
countries is an excellent predictor (R2= .78) of subsequent increases in government tax
revenue. Kimakova (2009) contends that financial openness is also associated with
government size. Greater exposure to international capital flows, results in larger
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governments. In the face of economic globalization, Bhagwati (2007) advocates that
governments should become larger in order to compensate the losers from trade reform,
keeping in mind that while trade may be beneficial to the country as a whole, some
sectors, firms, and individuals exposed to foreign competition may be harmed. Winners
from trade are the consumers who are able to purchase cheaper imported goods and the
producers that make goods for export. Losers from trade are those producers who are
faced with competition from foreign producers as well as consumers in the exporting
countries who must pay more for the good. Garrett contends the effects of globalization
on government spending are more pronounced for developing countries (Garrett 2001).
Expansion of voting rights is also thought by many theorists to result in increased
taxation and government spending. Meltzer and Richard (1981) argue that expansions of
the voting franchise invariably add lower income voters who tend to favor income
redistribution policies. The researchers are reiterating an observation made by
Tocqueville nearly two centuries ago (Tocqueville 1965). In partial confirmation, Husted
and Kenny (1997) find that the elimination of poll taxes and literacy tests in several U.S.
states by the mid 1960‘s resulted in an increase in demand for welfare and other transfer
payments but did not result in an increase in demand for governmental services. A
similar finding is evident in ten Western European countries from 1860 to 1938
(Aidtyand & Jensenz 2009).
Many other explanations for the size of government have been offered with
varying degrees of empirical support. Voter demographics may play a role for example.
Becker (1983) and Becker and Mulligan (2003) argue that as a population ages, political
pressure grows to increase social security benefits and to transfer the tax burden from
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taxes on capital to taxes on labor. Becker and Mulligan (2003) point to the work of
Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999) who find that U.S. government spending on the
elderly increased from 1.1% to 8.8% of GDP in the second half of the 20th century while
non-elderly government spending stayed relatively constant at around 25% of GDP. This
is a manifestation of Schumpeter‘s ―lobby of the old‖ (Schumpeter 1991, 377). Others
however, have reached contrary conclusions about the elderly political clout in the United
States and Western Europe with respect to government spending and taxation (Razin,
Sadka, & Swagel 2002).
The number of legislators a government has may influence tax levels and overall
government spending. Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnson (1981) formulate a model of
government spending and observe a positive relationship between ‗seats and spending‘ in
unicameral legislatures. Chen and Malhotra (2007) extend the Weingast model to
bicameral legislatures and analyze data from the United States Senate. Various
constitutional provisions also affect the size of government according to Persson and
Taballini (2004) although their conclusion has been challenged (Acemoglu 2005).
Democracy seems to lead to a larger government and higher taxation (Alesina,
Spolaore, & Wacziarg 2000). Further, the form of democracy appears to matter as well
with parliamentary systems resulting in higher taxes and more government spending than
presidential type systems (Persson & Tabellini 2004). Political competition, defined as
the absence of monopoly or near monopoly power by one political party, seems to lower
tax levels (Besley, Persson, & Sturm 2005) while political instability seems to increase
spending (Annett 2001), an observation once noted by Aristotle (Mahon 2004). At the
opposite extreme from high tax states are low tax states which are more commonly
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referred to as states suffering from low tax effort. Low tax effort is a hallmark of many
countries, especially those in Latin America, suggesting that culture may play a role.
All governments need sufficient revenue in order to properly function.
Governments of developing nations need additional revenue in order to build needed
infrastructure. Some countries and regions do better collecting sufficient tax revenue
than others. Among others, the governments of Latin America, for example are almost
without exception chronically and materially underfunded (Bird, Martinez-Vazquez, &
Togler 2008). This leads to a vicious circle in that an underfunded government is a weak
government, and a weak government has less ability to enforce its own laws including the
collection of tax revenues. Less tax revenue in turn leads to greater weakness.
Countries with high levels of income inequality also tend to be weak states which
oscillate between dictatorship and fragile democracy according to Acemoglu and
Robinson (2001). The authors cite Argentina as an example which shifted seven times
from dictatorship to democracy or vice-versa in the twentieth century. Argentina‘s
income inequality, as measured by its Gini coefficient is 51 according to the World Bank
(2011). By way of comparison high income countries have an average Gini coefficient of
35, South Asian countries 37 and Middle Eastern Countries 39. Acemoglu and Robinson
(2001) speculate that low tax effort may result in such countries as a safeguard against
coup d‘état.
Bird, Martinez-Vazquez, and Togler (2008) theorize that low tax effort countries
lack a social contract between the state and its citizens. Such a social contract is the
foundation of a properly functioning tax system. The authors also speculate that political
will is necessary for tax reform, a view shared by Stein (2005). Bowler and Donovan
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(1995) provide empirical evidence of voters linking dissatisfaction with government to
dissatisfaction with taxation. Accordingly, better government may result in better tax
collection and higher tax effort.
Moore (2004) contends that the source of governmental revenue has a dramatic
effect on state behavior. In other words, the quality of governance is better when the
state depends upon its citizens for revenue. Moore (2004) points to historical examples
as well as the modern day examples of Poland and Russia. Upon the fall of communism,
Poland instituted a broadly based tax system and is more responsive to its citizens while
Russia has relied upon the taxation of natural resources for its revenue and is less
responsive. Responsive government, according to Bird, Martinez-Vazques, and Togler
(2008, 58) is, ―an essential precondition for a more adequate level of tax effort.‖
A country‘s inability to collect sufficient tax revenue results in significant budget
deficits which add to the national debt. Greater amounts of debt in turn lead to greater
interest obligations which further strain government finances (Offerdal 2004).
Additionally, in an attempt to increase revenue collections, low tax effort governments
have imposed some of the most economically distorting types of taxes. According to
Hubbard (2002, 21) ―governments are tempted to turn to schemes that secure revenue
despite their inefficiency and broad cost to the economy.‖ Latin American governments
for example have imposed such distortive taxes as taxes on corporate assets, equity,
minimum income, and bank transaction taxes (Muniz 2006). Although all taxes create
deadweight losses, these taxes are thought to be associated with especially large losses of
welfare over and above the amount of the tax collected. A minimum income tax is a tax
on deemed income which is typically calculated assuming a fixed return on revenues,
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equity, or assets. A bank transaction tax is a tax on a specific type of financial
transaction such as a bank deposit, transfer, or check. Although they have been reduced
by considerable margins throughout much of the world; trade inhibiting tariffs and export
duties have remained high in the region. Indeed, international trade taxes in Latin
America as a percentage of total tax revenue are nearly six times as high as they are in
Eastern and Central Europe and over 40 times higher than in the industrialized nations of
the world (Inter-American Development Bank 2010). Distortive taxes, as well as high
taxation of international trade, inhibit economic activity, and accordingly, reduce growth.
Both Acemoglu (2005) and Sindzingre (2007) believe that the very essence of a
state is defined by its ability to tax. Weak states according to Sindzingre (2007) are those
that lack the power, will, or credibility to stand up to political challenges and impose
taxation on their own citizens. Bergman (2002) contends that historically, monarchs and
governments have risen and fallen based on their ability to collect sufficient revenues
from their subjects.
Definition of Culture
Any study which utilizes culture as an explanatory variable must take great care
in defining precisely what ‗culture‘ means. Culture is, after all, a term which has been
defined by scholars literally hundreds of times (Kuper 1999). It has become, according to
Kuper an overused catch all phrase with multiple meanings subject to manipulation by
scholars. Indeed, Kuper (1999) documents some 157 definitions of culture used by
American anthropologists between 1920 and 1950 alone. Still, a consensus on culture‘s
definition has emerged (Kuper 1999). According to the consensus view culture is learned
not innate; not a matter of race or ethnicity and involves ideas and values. Further the
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consensus holds that aspects of culture are common to all mankind and that mankind‘s
common culture has advanced over very long periods of time (Kuper 1999).
Geertz (1977) favors what he terms the classical definition of culture. Culture, to
Geertz consists of the knowledge, beliefs, law, morals, and customs of a people.
Concurring with Geertz‘ definition of culture is Kuper (1999) who adds only the
importance of tradition to the definition. Culture can also be thought of as a defense
against human nature since culture acts as a constraint against inappropriate action
according to Geertz (1977).
Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) consider culture to be a broadly defined collective
phenomenon. They state that ―culture consists of the unwritten rules of the social game.
It is the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group
or category of people from others‖ (Hofstede & Hofstede 2005, 4). Culture, to the
Hofstede‘s is acquired over a person‘s lifetime with much of it learned during childhood.
Culture rests between human nature and individual personality.
Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) also contend that multiple levels of culture exist.
Those levels consist of a national level; a regional and/or ethnic and/or religious and/or
linguistic level; a gender level; a generational level; a social class level and for those
employed an organizational, departmental and/or corporate level.
Hofstede‘s survey finds no evidence of cultural convergence and little support for
Huntington‘s multiple civilization hypotheses (Hofstede & Hofstede 2005). Huntington
(1993 and 1996) argues that civilizations are cultures writ large and as such are the
primary factor in international affairs. Hofstede‘s multinational surveys do not however
support Huntington‘s conclusion rather they find significant attitudinal differences among
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nations within the same civilization (Hofstede & Hofstede 2005). Indeed, Hofstede‘s
culture dimensions show little apparent civilization based pattern. For example, in the
masculinity and femininity cultural dimension a European Union country, Slovakia
scores highest while another European Union country, Sweden finishes lowest. Likewise
in the power distance cultural dimension a Central American nation, Panama scores
second highest while its next door neighbor, Costa Rica has nearly the lowest observed
score. Only in individualism and power distance are some of Huntington‘s civilization
patterns apparent. Western nations generally score high on individualism and low on
masculinity relative to the rest of the world, although even there exceptions exist
(Hofstede & Hofstede 2005). Conversely, Inglehart‘s mapping of cultural values from
the World Values Survey seems to confirm Huntington‘s eight or nine civilizations, at
least to a limited extent (Inglehart & Welzel 2005).
Disputing Huntington‘s civilization theory is Wei-Ming (2000) who argues that
American culture differs sufficiently from European culture and that merging them into
one Western culture is erroneous. Further, Wei-Ming contends that even within Europe
the cultures and historical experiences of Britain, France, and Germany are so
significantly different that generalization is impossible. Hofstede (2001) concurs, finding
vast cultural differences even among geographic neighbors in Europe. Even Britain itself
is by no means a monolithic culture (Sowell 1996). Likewise Reid (2007) finds vast
cultural differences among Latin American countries. Panama, Costa Rica, and
Nicaragua, for example differ significantly culturally.
Harrison and Huntington (2000) concur with Hofstede (2001) that cultures
typically change only very slowly over time. They point out however, that sometimes
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dramatic changes in culture can occur; citing post World War II Japan and Germany as
examples of cultures which experienced rapid change. Schumpeter (1991) also concurs,
finding a historic aversion to change among peoples and concluding that aversion to
change must be part of human nature. The fact that national culture is generally fixed
over relatively long periods of time justifies the use of measures of national culture
collected over extended periods of time.
Campbell (2004) maintains that cultures and institutions typically change very
slowly over time in most circumstances, even when faced with significant external
pressures. Campbell, in a study of tax systems throughout the world finds globalization
has little effect on tax culture or institutions. Huntington (1993 and 1996) concurs,
arguing that civilizations and cultures are not converging toward a common or universal
culture.
Inglehart and Baker (2000) view culture as being path dependent, a view shared
by Campbell (2004). The authors also argue that causality between culture and
economics is difficult to ascertain. Inglehart and Baker (2000) like Weber (2003) view
cultural change as being necessary for economic development. In other words, the
developing world must adopt modern cultural values in order to economically develop.
Traditional cultural values, according to Inglehart and Welzel (2005), act as a deterrent to
economic development.
Fukuyama (2002) sees such things as: truth telling, meeting obligations, and
reciprocity as being productive or useful cultural values. These values incidentally
correspond closely to Weber‘s Protestant Work Ethic (Weber 2003). The Protestant
Reformation was of critical importance, according to Weber because it extended honesty
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and reciprocity beyond the family to society at large. That expansion was necessary for
the subsequent development of both capitalism and democracy (Weber 2003).
Paradoxically strong family ties are detrimental to modern society according to
Fukuyama (2000). Fukuyama cites China and Latin America as examples where strong
family ties interfering with societal interactions. Likewise Putnam (1993) cites southern
Italy as a region negatively impacted by strong family ties.
Hofstede‘s Cultural Dimensions
This paper relies on Hofstede‘s (2001) cultural dimensions. Hofstede contends
that national cultures exist and that those differences are significant enough to matter to
many things, including tax policy (Hofstede 2001). Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) define
culture as ‗collective mental programming‘ which is shared by all members of a nation,
region, or group. According to Hofstede (2004), culture at its deepest level, is
unconscious and not open to discussion. It is also relatively fixed over long periods of
time. Hofstede (2001) identified four cultural dimensions from data collected from IBM
employees spread throughout the world. The four cultural dimensions are: power
distance; uncertainty avoidance; individualism and collectivism, and masculinity and
femininity. A fifth cultural dimension, long term versus short term was subsequently
identified from further surveying.
Four of Hofstede‘s five cultural dimensions appear to be directly applicable to a
country‘s level of tax effort. Individualism and collectivism is the first such dimension.
At the extreme, countries with high scores on individualism are more loosely organized
with a large amount of individual freedom, while high collectivism societies are more
cloistered with the family, the clan, or the local tribe being the dominant cultural feature.
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Collectivism has been identified as being associated with undesirable social and
economic outcomes. Individualistic societies tend to be more open and allow for greater
social mobility. Individualistic societies are more concerned with the individual while
collectivist societies are concerned with the group. Loyalty to society, associated with
high individualist societies, should be associated with a willingness to pay higher taxes
for the benefit of society.
The second Hofstede cultural dimension hypothesized to be related to a country‘s
level of tax effort is what Hofstede calls masculinity and femininity. In high masculine
societies typical masculine values predominate. Such things as showing off, valuing
outward appearances, and performing are stressed. In more feminine societies traditional
feminine values are more important. Relationship building, cooperation, modesty, and
the quality of life are important in such societies. Feminine societies tend to be more
modern while masculine societies tend to be more traditional. Sweden and the
Netherlands are examples of feminine societies while Spain and Argentina are examples
of masculine societies. The greater concern for other members of society observed in
more feminine societies should translate into a greater willingness to submit to taxation,
and accordingly, such societies should have higher tax efforts.
The third Hofstede cultural dimension hypothesized to be related to tax effort is
power distance. Power distance relates to the manner in which societies deal with human
inequality. Inequality among individuals is explicit in the superior subordinate
relationship. Inequality also can be related to physical or mental characteristics, social
standing, prestige, income, wealth, power, age, or occupation (Hofstede 2001). Societies
in which power distance is great are termed elitist while those with little distance between
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social levels are considered pluralist. Power distance scores of countries are consistent
over time as trend data, according to Hofstede (2001), indicates no evidence of
significant movement. In societies with high power distance, there is a large gap in social
standing between those with prestige and those without, while in countries with low
power distance scores, the gap is minimal. Countries with high power distance scores
include Malaysia, as well as most Arab and many Latin American countries. Countries
with low power distance include many European states as well as Costa Rica. Pluralist or
low power distance societies should be associated with a greater willingness to submit to
taxation and, accordingly, higher tax effort.
The fourth and final Hofstede cultural dimension hypothesized to be related to tax
effort is uncertainty avoidance. Uncertainty avoidance is a cultural coping mechanism
which compensates for the anxiety associated with an unpredictable and uncertain future
(Hofstede 2001). Societies throughout the world have developed diverse strategies for
dealing with uncertainty. The name as well as the theoretical basis is from Cyert and
March (1963). Uncertainty avoidance is manifested through technology, laws, and
religious practices (Hofstede 2001). Coping with the inevitable uncertainty of life is a
non-rational process with deep historical roots according to Hofstede (2001). Strong
uncertainty avoidance is associated with rigid rules and regulations. Rules and
regulations can be either formal or informal. Countries with high levels of uncertainty
avoidance include Greece, Portugal, and Guatemala. Countries with low levels of
uncertainty avoidance include Singapore, Jamaica, and Denmark (Hofstede 2001). A
higher level of uncertainty avoidance should be associated with a greater demand for
government and, accordingly such societies should be associated with higher tax efforts.
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Hofstede‘s cultural dimensions have been used to explain national differences in a
wide range of social, political, and economic phenomena. The cultural dimensions have
also been used to explain differences in such diverse things as union membership rates
(Singh 2001), antibiotic use (Deschepper 2008), and the use of video-conferencing
(Dustdar 1999). This paper extends usage of Hofstede‘s cultural dimensions to tax effort
and the size of government.
Franke, Hofstede, and Bond (2001) find that variation in national cultural
attributes explains a large share of differences in economic growth among countries. The
authors analyze a sample of 18 countries over two time periods and find that both certain
cultural values and beliefs are conducive toward growth.
Ding, Jean, and Stolowy (2005) utilize Hofstede‘s cultural variables to show that
cultural factors contribute toward the differences in national accounting practices. In a
sample of 52 countries with individually articulated national accounting principles the
authors find that culture matters more to accounting policy divergence than does legal
origin. Likewise Lewis (2001) utilizes information from the Securities and Exchange
Commission and finds a statistically significant relationship between Hofstede‘s
individualism cultural dimension and national income measurement practices. The
finding confirms Gray‘s (1988) theory that national culture affects national accounting
principles and practices.
Hope et al (2008) find that cultural factors, as measured by Hofstede, have an
effect on firms‘ choice of auditor. Using a very large sample of firms from 37 countries,
the authors find that firms from countries with high levels of power distance and
uncertainty avoidance and low levels of individualism are less likely to hire a big 4
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auditor after controlling for various firm attributes. In a similar study, Tsakumis (2007)
finds that national culture as measured by Hofstede is a determinant of differences in
willingness to disclose adverse information in accounting statement footnotes. Likewise,
Chan, Lin, and Mo (2003) find a correlation between Hofstede‘s cultural dimensions and
the magnitude of accounting errors discovered during financial statement audits. Tsui
and Windsor (2001) find that Hofstede‘s cultural dimensions are associated with
differences in ethical reasoning among auditors in Australia and China.
Husted (1999) finds that Hofstede‘s cultural dimensions impact corruption levels
after controlling for national wealth, income distribution, and government size.
Specifically high scores on power distance, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance are all
significantly correlated with high levels of corruption.
Modernization Theory
Providing a theoretical foundation for the divergence of national cultures
observed by Hofstede (2001) is Modernization Theory. The key tenant of Modernization
Theory is that socioeconomic progress brings with it, significant and fundamental cultural
change (Inglehart & Welzel 2005). When a society develops and modernizes
fundamental changes occur in its cultural values and beliefs. It is a contention which has
strong empirical support. The empirical support is provided by World Values Survey
(Inglehart 2010). The World Values Survey is a series of national level personal opinion
surveys conducted in many countries throughout the world every five years or so. The
initial survey was conducted in 1981 and covered 24 mostly European countries. The
most recently completed survey started in 2005 and covered over 80 nations throughout
the world. Those nations represent nearly 85 percent of the world‘s population. The
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surveys are intended to provide information on the values and beliefs of the world‘s
inhabitants. The surveys grew out of the European Values Survey and are conducted
under the direction of Ronald Inglehart of the Institute of Social Research at the
University of Michigan.
Inglehart and Welzel (2005) contend that values and beliefs are of crucial
importance. Indeed, values and beliefs shape and define human behavior. The
researchers also see fundamental changes occurring to the belief systems of people
throughout the world. Those changes are primarily driven by socioeconomic
development. Cultural changes are not random but neither are they linear, rather cultural
change occurs in fits and starts. Based on the analysis of World Values Survey data,
Inglehart and Welzel (2005, 15) conclude:
-There is a wide diversity of cultural values throughout the world. Core beliefs
and values differ greatly between nations and groups of nations. This is
especially true of differences between the developed world and the developing
world.
-Cultural values change but they do so in a largely predictable pattern. Cultural
change is mostly dependent upon socioeconomic development with changes in the
composition of the labor force sector being the most important determinate.
-Changing cultural values have important consequences at the societal level with
respect to governance, equality, the rule of law, and democracy.
-At any given point in time, a society‘s culture is shaped by the interaction of
changes brought about by socioeconomic development and the society‘s historic
cultural traditions.
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-Cultures change, but they do so in a path dependent manner. A society‘s cultural
traditions limit the range of cultural change.
-Cultural differences among nations are robust and endure over time. There is no
evidence of worldwide cultural homogenization. Cultural differences among
nations are as great in 2001 as they were in 1981.
The common theme of changing values and beliefs throughout all societies of the
world is the striving for greater individual autonomy and personal choice (Inglehart &
Welzel 2005). As socioeconomic development occurs, material, social, and cognitive
constraints on human activity are lessened (Inglehart & Welzel 2005). Development
literally expands the range of human thought, according to the authors. This view is
supported by data from the World Values Survey.
The World Values Survey has been utilized by researchers in a number of fields.
Data from the surveys has been used in a wide range of studies including such diverse
areas as preferences for trade protection (Mayda & Rodrik 2005), the gender gap in math
scores (Guizo et al 2008) and the incidence of violent crime (Lederman, Loayza, &
Menendez 2002).
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2006) find that culture affects economic
outcomes. Utilizing World Value Survey data, the authors first show culture has an
effect on preferences for redistribution. The authors then provide evidence that
preferences for redistribution have an effect on actual redistribution and taxation policies
in a study of U.S. states. In an earlier study Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2003) find an
association between culture; again as measured by the World Values Survey and national
savings and investment.

25
Tabellini (2010) finds culture as measured by the World Values Survey to be
associated with GDP per capita as well as economic growth. Granato, Inglehart, and
Leblang (1996) reach a similar conclusion also utilizing the World Values Survey data.
In a study of tax morale in Latin America Togler (2005) finds that aspects of
national culture as measured by the World Values Survey are major factors in
determining the willingness to comply with tax laws. A similar finding is reported by
Alm and Togler (2005) in a study of tax morale in the United States and Europe.
Taking a somewhat contrary position, Harrison (2006) argues that politics, or
more specifically political will, can change national cultures. He cites Singapore and
Chile as examples where strong political leadership committed to change has had
dramatic affects on the national culture and prosperity.
Conceptually, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) see a two-stage process that societies
undergo in their transition from traditional to modern. In the first stage, the society‘s
economy transitions from being based on agriculture to becoming more industrialized.
At this stage of development rationalizations, secularizations, and bureaucratization of
society occur. This process is accompanied by a lessening in the importance of
traditional values and beliefs, including a lessening in the importance of God. Indeed,
among the developing nations of the world, God is important on a daily basis by up to
ninety five percent of the population in some countries but as little as three percent in
some highly developed nations (Inglehart & Welzel 2005).
The historic development of modernization theory can be traced to 18th century
French mathematician, philosopher, and economist Marquis de Condorcet and the Age of
Enlightenment (Inglehart & Welzel 2005). De Condorcet was the first to write of the
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idea of progress. The expansion of knowledge, de Condorcet contends, will act to
expand material well being, political freedom, and virtue. Progress leads to the inevitable
perfection of humankind, according to de Condorcet (Acton 2007). Notable theorists
Adam Smith, Karl Marx, and Max Weber also contributed to Modernization Theory
(Inglehart & Welzel 2005). While they offer decidedly differing interpretations of
modernization, each sees technological innovation and socioeconomic development as
having profound effects on humankind‘s cultural values. Among the first theories of
economic development was the idea that the traditional values of poor societies needed to
be changed in order for those societies to develop. In other words, cultural change will
lead to economic growth and development. Rostow (1959) as well as Almond and
Coleman (1960), and Pye and Verba (1969), all make such arguments. Inglehart and
Welzel (2005), based on their analysis of World Values Survey data, find that it is
economic development which causes cultural change.
Broadly defined, the two stages of transition from traditional to modern can be
depicted as follows:
Stage 1: Industrialization results in a transition from traditional values to secular rational
values.
Stage 2: Post-Industrial Modernization results in a transition from survivalist values to
self expression values.
According to the world cultural map (Inglehart & Welzel 2005) Zimbabwe and
Morocco are examples of traditional societies. They have yet to industrialize and
accordingly are pre-stage one. As such they have strong traditional and survivalist
values. Russia and Bulgaria are examples of countries which have completed stage one.
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They are industrialized societies which score strong in secular rational values but weak in
self expression values. Japan and Norway are examples of countries which have
completed both stages. Their societies have strong secular rational values and strong self
expressionist values.
In general all societies are currently in the process of cultural change, some on a
massive scale, with the most developed nations of the world undergoing the greatest
degree of change in values and beliefs (Inglehart & Welzel 2005). The percentage of the
labor force employed in the industrial sector appears to have the strongest effect on a
society‘s cultural values. A preindustrial society with most of its labor force employed in
agriculture has strong traditional values. As a society industrializes and the size of the
labor force devoted to industry grows, the values of society gradually shift to become
more secular-rational and less traditional. This value shift does not increase individual
autonomy but rather replaces the authority of God and of organized religion with the
authority of technology, science, and the organized industrial sector. There is no loss of
authority when cultural values shift from traditional to secular-rational; it is the nature of
the authority which undergoes change (Inglehart & Welzel 2005).
It is the second stage of cultural transition where respect for authority diminishes.
When societies transition from industrial to post-industrial cultural values begin to shift
from survivalist to self-expression (Inglehart & Welzel 2005). Respect for authority
diminishes and many key institutions of industrial society are eroded as individual
autonomy increases. The second stage of cultural transition occurs once the economy
evolves from its industrial base to become a service based economy. The percentage of
the labor force employed in the industrial sector declines and employment in the service
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sector increases. Inglehart and Welzel (2005) theorize that the knowledge based
economy significantly increases the range of human interactions. This in turn has
significant effects on cultural values and beliefs.
Self expression values, contrary to the implication of their name are not self or
ego-centric, but rather are humanistic. Such values are people centered and are
concerned with individual autonomy expanding personal freedom (Inglehart & Welzel
2005).
Although cultural values are changing throughout the world, they are doing so
very gradually (Inglehart & Welzel 2005). Cultural values, to a great extent are
determined early in life and largely reflect prevailing conditions in society. Contrary to
prevailing views, survey data indicates that cultural values do not change much over a
person‘s lifetime. Accordingly, societal cultural values and beliefs change only as one
generation is replaced by the next (Inglehart & Welzel 2005). Accordingly, the World
Values Survey lends some credibility to Hofstede‘s (2001) contention that cultural
changes occur slowly and gradually and therefore cultural scores obtained from the IBM
surveys maintain their original usefulness. Adding further credence is Inglehart and
Welzel‘s (2005) observation that all or virtually all societies in the world are undergoing
cultural change and further that those changes are all in the same direction. Cultural
changes observed by Inglehart and Welzel (2005) are from traditional values to secular
rational and from survivalist to self expressionist.
Inglehart and Welzel (2005) contend that there is a certain evolutionary logic
associated with cultural change, a view shared by Porter (2000). Cultures change, only
when there is a compelling reason for them to do so. Socioeconomic development is by
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far the most compelling reason for a culture to change. It is not however the only reason
cultures change as a significant portion of cultural change remains unexplained (Inglehart
& Welzel 2005).
Conceptually the idea of progress is a relatively recent phenomenon. Sustained
economic growth, where production growth exceeded population growth, created the
revolutionary concept of human progress (North & Thomas 1973). Prior to that
occurrence, survival and avoiding starvation were humankind‘s primary if not exclusive
priorities. The simple fact that most people in the Western world, for the last five
hundred years or so, wake up with the notion that they will not starve to death that day is
unique in human history and further, has profound implications on cultural values and
beliefs (Inglehart & Welzel 2005). According to Inglehart and Welzel (2005, 23),
―throughout history, survival has been precarious and human choice has been restricted
for most people,‖ it is only with the advent of socioeconomic development that
humankind has been liberated from such severe constraints. Socioeconomic
development has lessened material, social, and cognitive constrains on humans, and it has
greatly expanded the realm of possibilities (Inglehart & Welzel 2005).
Culture and Economics
That culture matters to economics is a controversial contention. Many
economists, for a variety of reasons, do not like culture as an explanation for economic
phenomenon. However, Hojman (1999) in an extensive review of the literature notes that
there is now a substantial body of literature which posits the view that culture has a direct
effect on economics, Gereffi (1989), Lobkowski (1991), Inglehart and Baker (2000),
Montaner (2000), Fukuyama (2002), Bergman (2002 and 2003),You and Khagram
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(2005), Guiso (2006), and Tabillini (2010) concur. Fukuyama (2002) contends that in
the past cultural explanations have been abused, while Olson (1996) maintains that the
concept of culture is too vague and accordingly does not lend itself toward fitting into
production functions. Obviously a variable must be quantified in order to be measured or
to fit into an econometric model, which undoubtedly contributes to culture‘s lack of
widespread use among economists. However, Schumpeter reminds us that economists
should not ignore a phenomenon simply because it is difficult to measure (Schumpeter
1991). An additional factor may be as Sowell (2008) maintains, there is reluctance on the
part of researchers of pointing to culture as an explanation of the differences in
performance between countries or between groups because they do not want to be
accused of blaming the victim.
Still, culture appears to offer substantial explanation for many economic
phenomena and it is growing in acceptance among economists (Guiso, Sapienza, &
Zingales 2006). Guiso et al. (2006) notes that concepts of culture and economics were
originally closely linked by, among others, Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill. However,
they also caution that combining economics with cultural concepts brings with it the
problem of causality.
Assuming culture does have an effect on economics, the question remains: what is
the mechanism by which culture affects economics? In other words, how does culture
either benefit or hinder economics? Theorists have a wide range of views on the subject.
Fukuyama (2002) contends that culture is the predominant component of social capital
and that social capital is important to economic development. Hojman (1999) is

31
convinced culture effects attitudes toward such things as work, innovation, savings, and
profits. Landes (1999), not to mention Weber (2003), concur.
According to Huntington, culture must be at least partially responsible for the vast
differences in development between the developing and developed worlds (Harrison &
Huntington 2000). Harrison (1985) finds that aspects of Latin American‘s culture are
detrimental to its growth and development. Latin American culture differs from North
American culture according to Harrison (1985) in its time orientation, work ethic,
frugality, education, merit, ethics and corruption, justice, and secularism.
Huntington (1996) contends Russia‘s Orthodox culture inhibits its economic
growth. Likewise Islamic culture in the Middle East hinders its economic development
according to Huntington (1996). Sachs (2000) disagrees, finding no evidence Muslim
societies are at a disadvantage economically after controlling for economic policies and
geography. Cameron and Neal (2003) concur, finding that historically Islam has been
favorably disposed toward merchants and trade. Hourani (1991) agrees noting the
expansion of international trade and the proliferation of merchants, craftsmen, and
scholars which coincided with the creation of the Muslim empire.
There are many examples of minority cultural groups thriving within an otherwise
poorly functioning economic system. Both Sowell (1996 and 2008) and Harrison and
Huntington (2000) discuss multiple examples of economically successful minority groups
such as the Chinese in South East Asia, the Japanese in Brazil, the Ibo‘s in Nigeria, the
Indians in East Africa, the Lebanese in West Africa, and the Jews in many locations.
Although the economically successful minority groups are geographically and otherwise
diverse, Sowell (1996) finds that they have much in common regarding their views on

32
hard work, thrift, and sobriety. Weber (2003) offers at least a partial explanation for the
phenomenon when he observes that minority groups are often excluded from the political
process and driven into (lowly regarded) economic activity in order to survive.
Landes (1996) discusses a couple of paradox to the culture matters argument. The
first paradox is that if culture matters then why have the Chinese been so successful
abroad and so unsuccessful, until recently, at home? The second paradox is if culture
matters then why have the Chinese been so unsuccessful for so long and lately so
successful? Sachs (2000) reiterates by pointing to China‘s explosive growth since its
economic opening in 1978 as evidence that it is policy and not culture that matters to
economics. However, rather than indicate that culture does not matter to economics, it is
much more likely that other factors, in addition to culture, matter as well. Porter (2000)
concurs, maintaining that the proper macroeconomic policies are a necessary but not a
sufficient condition for growth.
Also potentially weakening the culture matters to economics argument is the fact
that many widely diverse cultures have achieved economic development. Japan, the
Asian Tigers as well as, to a lesser extent Chile, Costa Rico, Barbados, and Botswana are
all examples of non-Western economic success stories. However, Sowell (1996) notes
many cultural similarities among economically successful nations, especially with respect
to such things as work ethic, frugality, and education which transcend national cultures.
While Porter (2000) believes culture plays a role in economic progress, he
acknowledges that culture is complex and that its effects are difficult to isolate from other
factors, a view shared by Harrison (1985). Porter also contends that culture has an
influence on competitiveness at the micro or firm level. However Porter (2000) stops
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short of assigning blame for lack of development on developing countries poor work
ethic, contending that a lack of proper incentives is the likely cause.
Although national culture may be slow to change, economic culture may be
capable of much more rapid transformation. Porter (2000) cites Japan‘s high savings
rates and system of lifetime employment as relatively recent examples. Indeed, both
Japan‘s high savings rates and lifetime employment developed after its defeat in World
War II. High savings and investment rates in China would be an even more recent
example of rapid economic cultural change.
Globalization, Porter (2000) argues will not eradicate national cultures but rather
will enforce a form of discipline on economic cultures. Porter‘s view was voiced earlier
by American Sociologist Parsons (1967). Parsons (1967) felt that certain aspects of
Western culture such as industrialization and urbanization would spread across the globe
as other societies developed. Likewise Stiglitz (1998) contends that development
transforms societies. That transformation however is not orderly and linear; rather it is
messy and sloppy. Capitalism, Stiglitz (1998) reminds us took centuries to develop in the
West and entailed a societal transformation from the traditional to the modern. The long,
uneven, and arduous development of capitalism has been well documented by North and
Thomas (1973), Schumpeter (1991), and Weber (2003).
Fukuyama (2002) argues for the importance of social capital, which he defines as
the shared values and norms of a society which allow for cooperation. Social Capital is
of critical importance to economic development, democracy, and civil society according
to Fukuyama. Values and norms can be either positive or negative, with the La Cosa
Nostra or Mafia in Southern Italy being an extreme example of negative values and
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norms according to Fukuyama. Putnam (1993) concurs, finding that negative values and
institutions explain much of southern Italy‘s social and economic backwardness
compared to the northern Italy. Putnam‘s (1993) work built upon that of Banfield (1958)
who found what he termed ‗amoral familism‘ hindering development in a small town in
southern Italy. Fukuyama (2000) also considers China and Latin America to be examples
where strong family ties interfere with societal interactions. According to Fukuyama
(2000) positive or productive values include such things as: telling the truth, meeting
obligations, and reciprocity. The Protestant Reformation was important economically
according to Weber (2003) because it extended honesty, reciprocity, and thrift beyond the
immediate family to society at large.
Culture and Taxation
Nerre (2008) contends that a properly functioning tax system must take into
account a nation‘s tax culture. Tax culture, according to Nerre, is where the economics,
sociology, and history of a country meet. Strumpel (1969) sees tax culture as a
component of a nation‘s political culture. Tax culture is embedded within the larger
national culture. Nerre (2008, 155) defines tax culture as:
A country-specific tax culture is the entirety of all relevant formal and informal
institutions connected with the national tax system and its practical execution,
which are historically embedded within the country‘s culture, including the
dependencies and ties caused by their ongoing interaction.
Tax culture to Nerre (2008) is created by interactions among and between
taxpayers, tax officials, politicians, academics, as well as other tax and legal experts.
Thus tax culture is created in much the same manner as North (1991) contends,
institutions are created. This differs from Schumpeter‘s (1991) view of tax culture which
assumes imposition by the state. In other words, a nation‘s tax culture is exclusively

35
dependent upon its tax policy, with tax payers merely responding to the incentives
provided by the tax law. However, Schumpeter (1991) also contends that the ideal tax
system is bounded by a nation‘s history, economics, and sociology.
Martinez-Vazquez and Wallace (2000) contend that a nation‘s tax system relies
upon not only on the nation‘s tax culture but on its national culture and its institutions as
well. National culture and institutions place limits on a nation‘s tax system. For
example, some societies view certain activities as sacred, such as religious work or small
farming and therefore those activities can only be lightly taxed.
Nerre (2008) contends that when it comes to tax systems, one size does not fit all.
American style tax systems have had very little success in other parts of the world going
back to the 1930‘s. Further, attempts to impose a tax system from one society to another
have often led to disastrous results (Tanzi 1987). Tanzi (1987) cites the example of the
Cuban government publically burning the tax law recommendations of the American tax
delegation in 1931. American tax delegations were popular in the 1920‘s and 1930‘s and
consisted of American tax experts advising other nation‘s governments on what a proper
tax system ought to entail (Nerre 2008). Needless to say, they met with limited success
(Tanzi 1987).
The importance of tax culture typically only becomes apparent when significant
changes are contemplated or actually made to a country‘s tax system (Nerre 2008). Such
changes can result in tax cultural shock if they are made dramatically or if they are not in
accord with the national tax culture (Nerre 2008).
Tax culture is an often neglected aspect of the study of taxation and public
finance. Only in Latin America is tax culture covered extensively and there the focus is
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almost exclusively on taxpayer compliance (Cortázar-Velarde 2000). Taxpayer‘s
noncompliance in Latin America is a serious problem for the region‘s governments.
Latin American‘s are according to Tanzi (2000, 24) ―allergic to income taxes.‖ In a
similar vein, Bird and Wallace (2003, 1) contend that taxpayers in the region ―avoid the
full impact of the tax laws.‖ Likewise, Reid (2007) contends that in Latin America it is
well known that the wealthy simply do not pay taxes.
Tsakumis, Curatola, and Porcano (2007) analyze tax policy differences among
nations and find that Hofstede‘s (2001) cultural framework is correlated with tax evasion,
after controlling for income. Richardson (2008) reaches a similar conclusion in a follow
up study.
Campbell (2004) also contends that such a thing as ‗tax culture‘ exists. Tax
cultures, according to Campbell exist at the national level and progress in a path
dependent manner. Campbell (2004) argues that the concept of bricolage applies to tax
cultures. With cultural bricolage, new institutions take on the characteristics of the old
institutions they replace. In a multi-decade analysis of the tax systems of OECD member
countries, Campbell (2004) finds only modest convergence of tax cultures among nations
in spite of increasing competitive pressures brought on by globalization. Campbell‘s
finding makes sense in light of Nerre‘s (2008) contention that tax cultures exist at the
national level and, therefore a universally ‗objectively good‘ tax system cannot exist.
Each nation must adopt its own unique solution to the problem of financing its
government. Further, since social and economic conditions change over time, it only
follows that tax systems must evolve over time as well. This illustrates Slemrod‘s and
Bakija‘s (2004) observation that taxation is a perpetual struggle.
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Optimal taxation adherents also contend that a country‘s tax policy should be
reflective of its unique socioeconomic circumstances. Optimal Taxation Theory seeks to
devise a system of taxation which maximizes the social welfare of society (Slemrod
1990). It asks the question: What tax or set of taxes will raise sufficient revenue for the
government while leaving the taxpayers as well off as possible? It is an important
question since different tax systems vary greatly in their aggregate cost to society. Since
economies and societies differ in important respects, so too should tax systems.
According to Sandmo (2005) the two main elements in any optimal tax theory model are
the social welfare function of society and the revenue needs of the government. Other
objectives of optimal tax theory include: minimizing the aggregate costs of taxation to
society (Sandmo 2005), achieving production efficiency in the economy (Slemrod 1990),
and uniformity (Sorensen 2007). Uniformity is important for simplicities sake which
eases compliance and administrative burdens (Sorensen 2007), an important
consideration for tax systems first observed by Adam Smith (2009).
The principles of optimal taxation theory apply to developing countries as well as
to developed ones. Applying the theory to developing countries, however, introduces
additional complications. Seemingly everything is more difficult in developing countries
and tax policy is no different. Slemrod (1990) contends that administrative shortcomings
are often the reason that optimal tax policies are not implemented. Slemrod (1990) also
contends that empirical evidence indicates countries with low levels of literacy and
presumably less administrative capability tend to rely on easier to collect but more
economically distorting types of taxes. Corruption, which tends to be much more
prevalent in developing countries, must also be taken into account in the design of a tax
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system. According to Barreto and Alm (2003), the optimal tax mix in a corrupt economy
includes relatively more consumption taxation and relatively less income taxation than
would otherwise be the case. Optimal government size is also affected in such a society
with a smaller government sector being preferred in corrupt societies (Barreto & Alm
2003). Although such tradeoffs exist for all countries, the stakes are much higher for
developing nations. For example, it is generally held that in developing countries in dire
need of investment capital, capital income should not be taxed, yet the result of such a tax
policy would be highly regressive and inefficient from a social welfare perspective. That
leaves developing countries with an unpleasant choice of either a highly regressive yet
economically efficient tax system or else a less regressive but less economically efficient
tax system.
An additional complication of optimal taxation in the developing world is the
problem of tax evasion. Both Slemrod (1990) and Sandmo (2005) contend that an
optimal tax system must take into account the effects of tax evasion. Estimated rates of
tax evasion differ greatly across countries and seem to be especially prevalent in Latin
America. Sandmo (2005) contends tax evasion is a social phenomenon and that a
taxpayers‘ decision of whether or not to comply with the tax laws is dependent upon their
perception of the behavior of others.
Behavioral economists including those who study optimal taxation look at the
question from the opposite perspective. In other words why do people comply with tax
laws and pay their taxes? According to Gueth and Sausgruber (2004) empirical evidence
indicates taxpayers do not act in their own best interests. Most taxpayer face a small
probability of being caught cheating on their taxes and if caught subject to a relatively
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small penalty, yet the vast majority – at least in developed countries, comply with tax
laws and pay their taxes provide some evidence of level of compliance. Hanlon, Mills,
and Slemrod (2005) examine IRS audit results and find a corporate tax evasion rate of
only 17.4 % in the United States in 2001. They also find individual income tax evasion
of only 13.8 % in the same period. Likewise Schneider (2004) finds overall tax
compliance rates of 86.04, 84.33, 82.27, 85.10, 87.43, and 88.97 percent in Australia,
Canada, Denmark, France, New Zealand, and Japan respectively. Gueth and Sausgruber
(2004) believe social motives and a sense of social duty motivates taxpayers. Sandmo
(2005) concurs, contending taxpayers‘ conscience and the social stigma of being caught
compel compliance. Taxpayers are also motivated by considerations of fairness with
respect to the quality of governmental services received according to Sandmo (2005). In
Latin America‘s case it could be that poor government leads to poor taxpayer compliance
which leads to underfunded governments which in turn contributes to poor quality
government services.
In summary this paper relies on the theory that culture matters (Harrison &
Huntington 2000). More specifically, that culture manifests itself in economically
important ways including preferences for the size of government and the willingness to
submit to taxation in order to pay for government. This paper also relies on the idea that
no universal culture exists which explains preferences for the size of government.
Further, this paper relies on the idea that national cultures exist. The existence of
national cultures is supported by the theoretical work of Anderson (2006) and the
theoretical and empirical work of Hofstede (2001) and Inglehart and Welzel (2005).
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Additionally, this paper relies on the idea that culture can be measured and quantified in
meaningful ways.
Finally, this paper relies on the work of a number of other researchers who have
theoretically or empirically addressed the determinants of government size or of national
tax levels. The size of the governmental sector and the level of taxation vary
considerably among nations, among those who have contributed to understanding that
difference include: Tocqueville (1965); Meltzer and Richard (1981); Alesina and
Spolaore (1997); Alesina and Waciarg (1998); Rodrik (1998); Mulligan and Sala-iMartin (1999); Becker and Mulligan (2003); Persson and Tabellini (2004); Benarroch
and Panday (2008); Bird, Martinez-Vazquez, and Togler (2008), and Aidtyand and
Jensenz (2009).
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CHAPTER III
DATA, VARIABLES, AND HYPOTHESES
The dependent variable used in this analysis, tax effort, is formally defined as the
total amount of tax revenue collected from compulsory transfers from citizens to the
government divided by Gross Domestic Product of the country. Information on tax effort
is taken from the CIA World Factbook (CIA 2010). The CIA World Factbook compiles
data from a number of sources. Information on tax effort is from the International
Monetary Fund.
In a supplementary analysis, governmental expenditures are also used as the
dependent variable. This is done in order to confirm the results obtained with tax effort
as the dependent variable. Government expenditures represent the total current
expenditures for all governments within a country. Information on governmental
expenditures is taken from the CIA World Factbook (CIA 2010).
Primary Analysis
The main independent variables reflect cultural attributes at the national level.
Data on the main independent variables are taken from Hofstede and Hofstede (2005).
Hofstede‘s (2001) country scores are relative to the other countries in the set. Four of
Hofstede‘s five cultural dimensions are claimed to be related to tax effort. Those cultural
dimensions are: individualism and collectivism, masculinity and femininity, uncertainty
avoidance, and power distance.
Individualism ―pertains to societies in which the ties between individuals are
loose … collectivism as its opposite pertains to societies in which people from birth
onward are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which throughout people‘s
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lifetimes continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty‖ (Hofstede
2005, 76). Loyalty in collectivist societies is to the family, clan, or tribe and not to the
nation, or society at large. Further, there are low levels of interpersonal trust between
individuals in such societies (Fukuyama 2002). Banfield (1958) and Putnam (1993)
count the Sicilian Mafia as an extreme example of a high collectivist society. High
scores on individualism are predicted to be associated with high tax effort and
government spending.
Masculinity and femininity relates to traditional gender roles within society. High
scores on masculinity and femininity, as defined by Hofstede (2005) are associated with
clear divisions between the sexes. Men are strong, assertive, and driven by achievement
and material success. Women are modest, caring, and concerned with quality of life.
Low scores occur when gender roles overlap. More traditional societies tend to have
more clearly defined gender roles than do more modern ones. Low masculinity and
femininity scores are predicted to be associated with high tax effort and government
spending.
Power distance relates to the manner in which societies deal with human
inequality. Inequality among individuals is explicit in the superior subordinate work
relationship. Inequality among people can also be related to physical or mental
characteristics, social standing, prestige, income, wealth, power, age, or occupation
(Hofstede 2001). Societies in which power distance is great are termed elitist while those
with little distance between social levels are considered pluralist. Power distance scores
are independent of developmental status, according to Hofstede (2001). Power distance
scores of countries are consistent over time as trend data indicates no evidence of

43
significant movement (Hofstede 2001). Countries with low scores on power distance are
expected to be associated with high taxation and government spending.
Uncertainty avoidance relates to the coping mechanisms employed by a society to
deal with the uncertainties of life. Rules and regulation, both formal and informal
compensate for the anxiety associated with an unpredictable and uncertain future
(Hofstede 2001). Societies have developed diverse strategies for dealing with
uncertainty. It is hypothesized that some of those coping strategies are more conducive
toward higher taxation and larger governments than others. Countries with high scores
on uncertainty avoidance are expected to be associated with high tax effort and
government spending.
Control variables include Gross National Income per capita, trade openness,
population and whether or not a country is governed by a democratically elected
Parliament. Gross National Income per capita is a measure of a country‘s income. It is
scaled on a purchasing power parity basis for comparative purposes. Gross National
Income per capita is obtained from the World Bank‘s World Development Indicators
(World Bank 2010). The population of the country and its level of trade openness –
defined as exports plus imports divided by GDP, are also control variables. Population
data is from the CIA (2010) World Factbook while information on trade openness is from
the World Bank‘s World Development Indicators (World Bank 2010). A Parliamentary
dummy variable is also included since countries with Parliamentary type democracies
tend to have materially larger governments. Greater spending in Parliamentary type
governments is thought to be the result of their need to maintain coalitions and majorities
in order to remain in office (Persson, Roland, & Tabellini 2000).
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Data was collected for the years 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2006 representing the
years in which the World Values Surveys were conducted. The surveys provide
alternative cultural measures which allow for testing to confirm results observed using
the Hofstede cultural measures. Accordingly, the Hofstede (2001) cultural dimensions
are analyzed utilizing the same time periods. In other words, the dependent variable tax
effort is regressed against Hofstede‘s cultural dimensions and control variables with data
from the years 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2006.
Only discrete sovereign countries are included in this analysis, therefore
groupings of countries and regions within countries which are included in Hofstede and
Hofstede‘s (2005) analysis are excluded here. Countries involved in this analysis consist
of the following: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Canada, Czech Republic, Chile, China, Columbia, Croatia, Costa Rica, Denmark,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hong
Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan,
Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia,
Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Suriname, Sweden,
Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Trinidad, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States,
Uruguay, Venezuela, and Vietnam.
National cultural dimension scores as measured by Hofstede and Hofstede (2005)
are in Table 1 below. The scores are relative to one another, not absolute. As such they
reflect differences in cultural values among countries. The scores are on a 0 to 100 scale
based on the original IBM surveys. A few scores exceed 100; those scores are based on
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subsequent surveys. A high number means that a country scores high in individualism,
masculinity, power distance, or uncertainty avoidance.
Table 1
Hofstede and Hofstede’s National Cultural Scores

Country

Argentina
Australia
Austria
Bangladesh
Belgium
Brazil
Bulgaria
Canada
Czech Republic
Chile
China
Columbia
Croatia
Costa Rica
Denmark
Ecuador
El Salvador
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Guatemala
Hong Kong
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Iran
Ireland
Israel

PD

IND

MASC

UA

49
36
11
80
65
69
70
39
57
63
80
67
73
35
18
78
66
40
33
68
35
60
95
68
46
77
78
58
28
13

46
90
55
20
75
38
30
80
58
23
20
13
33
15
74
8
19
60
63
71
67
35
6
25
80
48
14
41
70
54

56
61
70
55
54
49
40
52
57
28
66
64
40
21
16
63
40
30
26
43
66
57
37
57
88
56
46
43
68
47

86
51
70
60
94
76
85
48
74
86
30
80
80
86
23
67
94
60
59
86
65
112
101
29
82
40
48
59
35
81
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Table 1 (continued).
Country

PD

IND

MASC

UA

Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Luxembourg
Malaysia
Malta
Mexico
Morocco
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Pakistan
Panama
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russia
Serbia
Singapore
Slovakia
Slovenia
South Africa
South Korea
Spain
Suriname
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan
Thailand
Trinidad
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay

50
45
54
40
104
56
81
70
38
22
31
55
95
64
94
68
63
90
93
86
74
104
71
49
60
57
85
31
34
58
64
47
66
35
40
61

76
39
46
60
26
59
30
46
80
79
69
14
11
16
32
60
27
30
39
25
20
52
27
65
18
51
47
71
68
17
20
16
37
89
91
36

70
68
95
50
50
47
69
53
14
58
8
50
44
45
64
64
31
42
36
43
48
110
19
63
39
42
37
5
70
45
34
58
45
66
62
38

75
13
92
70
36
96
82
68
53
49
50
70
86
87
44
93
104
90
95
92
8
51
88
49
85
86
92
29
58
69
64
55
85
35
46
100
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Table 1 (continued).

Country

PD

IND

MASC

UA

Venezuela
Vietnam

81
70

12
20

73
40

76
30

Note. PD is Power Distance; IND is Individualism and Collectivism; MASC is Masculinity and Femininity; UA is Uncertainty
Avoidance. Source: Hofstede and Hofstede (2005).

Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent
variables for the data used in the Hofstede analysis. Shown are the number of
observations, minimum, maximum, mean, median, and standard deviation for each of the
variables. Included in the data set are observations for 68 countries from the years 1990,
1995, 2000, and 2006.
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent and Independent Variables for the tests of
Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions.

Variable

n

Minimum Maximum

Mean

Standard
Median Deviation

Tax Effort
Government
Expenditures

272

1.83

59.87

23.84

18.39

17.26

272

2.31

76.92

25.3

19.73

17.45

Individualism
Masculinity
Uncertainty Avoidance
Power Distance

272
272
272
272

6
5
8
11

91
110
112
104

43.41
49.87
67.62
59.43

39
49.5
70
61

23.85
18.75
23.08
21.75

GNI per capita

264

490

58,750 14,049

10,355

11,289
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Table 2 (continued).

Variable
Population
Trade Openness
Parliamentary dummy

n
264
259
272

Minimum Maximum
0.36
3.98
0.00

1,321.85
438.09
1.00

Mean
71.90
71.52
0.65

Standard
Median Deviation
16.28
56.72
1.00

194.49
60.52
0.48

Tax Effort and Government Expenditures are expressed as a percentage of GDP.
Population is reflected in the millions.
GNI per capita is reflected in U.S. dollars.

The objective of this paper is to test the hypothesis that certain characteristics of a
nation‘s culture affect its tax effort. More specifically, to test the hypothesis that
countries with higher individualism and collectivism have higher tax effort. A further
objective is to test the hypothesis that countries with low masculinity and femininity
scores have higher tax effort. Such a finding will be in support of theory, outlined in this
paper. Another objective is to test the hypothesis that countries with high scores on
uncertainty avoidance have higher tax effort. The final objective is to test the hypothesis
that countries with low power distance scores have higher tax effort. Such findings will
be in support of the theory outlined in this paper.
Hypotheses
The main hypotheses in the study are as follows:
Statement of Null and Research (Alternative) Hypotheses:
Ho: There is not a relationship between Individualism and Collectivism and tax
effort.

49
H1: There is a direct relationship between Individualism and Collectivism and tax
effort.
H2: There is not a relationship between Masculinity and Feminism and tax effort.
H3: There is a direct relationship between Masculinity and Feminism and tax
effort.
H4: There is not a relationship between Power Distance and tax effort.
H5: There is a direct relationship between Power Distance and tax effort.
H6: There is not a relationship between Uncertainty Avoidance and tax effort.
H7: There is a direct relationship between Uncertainty Avoidance and tax effort.
The basic econometric model which tests the relationship between Hofstede‘s
(2001) cultural variables and the size of government is as follows:
𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡 = 𝛽₀ + 𝛽₁𝐼𝑁𝐷i + 𝛽₂𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐶i + 𝛽₃𝑃𝐷i + 𝛽₄𝑈𝐴i + 𝛽₅𝐺𝑁𝐼it + 𝛽₆𝑃𝑂𝑃it
+ 𝛽₇𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒it + 𝛽₈𝑃𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚it + 𝑢
Where:
Tax Effort is the size of the government expressed as a percentage of gross domestic
product.
IND is the Individualism and Collectivist country score.
MASC is the Masculinity and Femininity country score.
PD is the Power Distance country score.
UA is the Uncertainty Avoidance country score.
GNI is the Gross National Income per capita expressed on a Purchasing Power Parity
basis.
POP is the nation‘s population in millions.
Trade is the Trade Openness (Exports plus Imports divided by GDP) of the country.
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ParDum is the Parliamentary Dummy, One if the country is governed by a
democratically elected Parliament, zero otherwise.
u represents unobserved factors which affect the size of government. u also includes the
error term.
t = 1,2,3,4 corresponding to the years 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2006.
i is the individual country observation.
Supplemental Analysis
The supplemental analysis is conducted in order to confirm the results obtained
from the original analysis. This analysis utilizes an alternative source, the World Values
Survey (Inglehart 2010) for the national cultural attributes. The World Values Survey is
conducted every five years or so by social science researchers from leading universities
throughout the world. At least one thousand people are interviewed in each of the more
than eighty countries surveyed. The surveys are designed to be representative samples
and to reflect the basic values and beliefs of the societies surveyed. Five waves of
surveys have been conducted to date beginning in 1981. The most recently conducted
survey is the 2006 survey.
Researchers have identified two cultural dimensions which explain much of the
variation in basic values and beliefs. Those two cultural dimensions are traditional versus
secular rational values and survivalist versus self expression values. The traditional
versus secular rational dimension reflects the importance of religion and traditional
beliefs to society. Strongly traditional societies are deferential to authority, view religion
as very important in their lives, have strong family ties with well defined roles, are
nationalistic, and have limited tolerance for others. Societies which have high secular
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rational values are less deferential to authority, view religion as less important, are less
nationalistic, and have greater tolerance for others. El Salvador and Tanzania are
examples of countries with strong traditional values while Japan and Sweden are
examples of countries with strong secular rational values.
The survivalist versus self expression cultural dimension reflects the transition
from industrial society to post-industrial or knowledge society. In industrial societies, the
emphasis is on economic and physical security while in knowledge societies, the
emphasis shifts to individual well being, self expression, and the quality of life.
Countries with high self expression values place a strong emphasis on participation in
political and economic decision making, gender equality, and individual freedoms and
are generally tolerant of other cultures. Countries with strong self expressive values
include Canada and the Netherlands. Countries with strong survivalist values include
Russia and Romania (see Table 3).
As with the original analysis, the control variables consist of Gross National
Income per capita, trade openness, population, and whether or not a country is governed
by a democratically elected Parliament.
Gross National Income per capita is a measure of a country‘s income. It is scaled
on a purchasing power parity basis for comparative purposes. Gross National Income per
capita is obtained from the World Bank‘s World Development Indicators (World Bank
2010). The population of the country and its level of trade openness – defined as exports
plus imports divided by GDP, are also control variables. Population data is from the CIA
(2010) World Factbook while information on trade openness is from the World Bank‘s
World Development Indicators (World Bank 2010). A Parliamentary dummy variable is
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also included since countries with Parliamentary type democracies tend to have
materially larger governments than do Presidential type democracies. Greater spending
in Parliamentary type governments is thought to be the result of their need to maintain
coalitions and majorities in order to remain in office (Persson, Roland, & Tabellini 2000).
As with the Hofstede (2001) analysis data was collected for the years 1990, 1995,
2000, and 2006. Countries included in the analysis of the World Values Survey (Inglehart
2010) cultural dimensions are as follows: Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Argentina,
Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia, Brazil,
Britain, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, China, Columbia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Germany, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia,
Ethiopia, Finland, France, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hong Kong, Hungary,
Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordon, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxemburg, Macedonia, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Moldova,
Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru,
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, South Africa, South Korea,
Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay,
United States, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. As with the Hofstede
(2001) analysis, only discrete sovereign countries are included. Accordingly, certain subnational regions included in the World Values Survey (Inglehart 2010) are excluded.
The listing of the national cultural value scores from the World Values Survey
(Inglehart 2010) is in Table 3. Scores for both the traditional versus secular rational
cultural dimension and the survivalist versus self expression cultural dimension range
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from negative two to positive two. A negative score means that a society is more
traditional than secular rational or else more survivalist than self expressionist; with a
positive score the opposite is true.
Table 3
World Values Survey National Cultural Values
World Values Survey Nation-level mean scores on Traditional/Secular-rational and
Survival/Self-expression values dimensions, 1981 – 2007
(wave 1=1981, wave 2=1990, wave 3= 1995, wave 4= 2000, wave 5= 2006)
Trad

Self

Trad

Self

Nation &

Rat

Surv

Wave

Values

Values

Albania 3

0.52

-1.56

Albania 4

0.07

Algeria 4

-1.48

Andorra 5
Argentina 1

Trad

Self

Nation &

Rat

Surv

Nation &

Rat

Surv

Wave

Values

Values

Wave

Values

Values

Bulgaria 2

1.28

-1.33

Egypt 4

-1.69

-0.64

-1.14

Bulgaria 3

0.90

-1.23

Egypt 4

-1.61

-0.46

-0.74

Bulgaria 4

1.15

-1.52

El Salvador 4

-2.06

0.53

0.80

1.62

Bulgaria 5

0.00

-0.30

Argentina 2

-0.46

Argentina 3

1.13

-1.01

Estonia 2

1.30

-0.88

BurkinaFas 5

-1.32

-0.49

Estonia 3

1.27

-1.30

0.03

Canada 1

-0.52

1.04

Estonia 4

1.27

-1.19

-0.60

0.71

Canada 2

0.07

1.31

Ethiopia 5

-0.65

-0.36

Argentina 4

-0.95

0.36

Canada 4

-0.16

1.72

Finland 1

0.63

0.82

Argentina 5

-0.66

0.38

Canada 5

-0.26

1.91

Finland 2

1.21

1.26

Armenia 3

0.55

-1.31

Chile 2

-1.10

-0.20

Finland 3

0.68

1.01

Australia 1

-0.34

1.14

Chile 3

-0.81

-0.08

Finland 4

0.84

0.94

Australia 3

-0.18

1.96

Chile 4

-0.87

0.12

Finland 5

0.82

1.12

Australia 5

0.21

1.75

Chile 5

-0.87

0.00

France 1

0.54

0.13

Austria 2

0.23

0.80

China 2

1.79

-1.13

France 2

0.38

0.71

Austria 4

0.25

1.43

China 3

0.79

-1.23

France 4

0.52

0.94

Azerbaijan 3

-0.14

-1.38

China 4

1.20

-0.93

France 5

0.63

1.13

Bangladesh 3

-1.24

-1.10

China 5

0.80

-1.16

Galicia 3

-0.04

1.34

Bangladesh 4

-1.21

-0.93

Colombia 3

-1.71

0.34

Georgia 3

-0.04

-1.31

Belarus 2

0.93

-1.12

Colombia 4

-1.67

0.68

Ghana 3

-1.66

-0.05

Belarus 3
Belarus 4
Belgium 1

0.67
0.89
0.09

-1.72
-1.23
0.08

Colombia 5
Croatia 3
Croatia 4

-1.87
0.72
0.08

0.60
-0.51
0.31

Ghana 5
Greece 4
Guatemala 4

-1.94
0.77
-1.70

-0.29
0.55
-0.17
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Table 3 (continued).
Trad

Self

Trad

Self

Trad

Self

Nation &

Rat

Surv

Nation &

Rat

Surv

Nation &

Rat

Surv

Wave

Values

Values

Wave

Values

Values

Wave

Values

Values

Belgium 2

0.40

0.77

Cyprus 5

-0.56

0.13

Hong Kong 5

1.20

-0.98

Belgium 4

0.50

1.13

Czech 2

1.24

-0.11

Hungary 1

0.17

-1.07

Bosnia 3

0.09

-0.56

Czech 3

1.07

0.33

Hungary 2

0.46

-1.06

Bosnia 4

0.34

-0.65

Czech 4

1.23

0.38

Hungary 3

0.79

-0.77

Brazil 2

-0.95

-0.38

Denmark 1

1.60

1.44

Hungary 4

0.40

-1.22

Brazil 3

-1.29

0.02

Denmark 2

1.25

1.20

Iceland 1

0.01

0.83

Brazil 5

-0.98

0.61

Denmark 4

1.16

1.87

Iceland 2

0.27

1.12

Britain 1

-0.25

0.95

Dom Rep 3

-1.05

0.33

Iceland 4

0.44

1.63

Britain 2

0.08

1.13

E Germany 2

1.06

0.60

India 2

-0.49

-0.91

Britain 3

0.08

1.24

E Germany 3

1.74

0.58

India 3

-0.54

-0.69

Britain 4

0.29

1.31

E Germany 5

1.46

0.26

India 4

-0.52

-0.60

Britain 5

0.06

1.68

E. Germany 4

1.44

0.42

India 5

-0.36

-0.21

Indonesia 4

-1.07

-0.50

Moldova 5

0.47

-1.28

Russia 2

1.09

-1.34

Indonesia 5

-0.47

-0.80

Montenegro 3

0.58

-1.12

Russia 3

0.87

-1.85

Iran 3

-1.40

-0.34

Montenegro 4

0.86

-1.24

Russia 4

1.09

-1.88

Iran 4

-1.22

-0.45

Morocco 4

-1.64

-1.09

Russia 5

0.49

-1.42

Iraq 5

-0.40

-1.68

Morocco 5

-1.32

-1.04

Rwanda 5

-1.57

-0.62

Ireland 1

-0.92

0.59

Moscow 2

1.44

-0.79

S Africa 1

-0.53

-0.40

Ireland 2

-1.10

1.00

N. Ireland 1

-0.78

-0.06

S Africa 2

-0.92

-0.46

Ireland 4

-0.91

1.18

N. Ireland 4

-0.33

0.84

S Africa 3

-1.26

-0.46

Israel 4

0.26

0.36

N. Ireland 2

-0.86

0.80

S Africa 5

-1.09

-0.10

Italy 1

0.18

-0.60

Neth‘lands 1

0.73

0.90

S Korea 1

1.08

-0.74

Italy 2

0.11

0.53

Neth‘lands 2

0.77

1.99

S Korea 2

1.11

-0.65

Italy 4

0.19

0.85

Neth‘lands 4

0.84

1.94

S Korea 3

0.96

-0.64

Italy 5

0.13

0.60

Neth‘lands 5

0.71

1.39

S Korea 5

0.61

-1.37

Japan 1

1.41

-0.41

N. Zealand 3

0.20

1.78

S.Africa 4

-1.12

-0.10

Japan 2

1.62

-0.12

N. Zealand 5

0.00

1.86

S.Korea 4

1.13

-0.55

Japan 3

1.79

0.37

Nigeria 2

-1.62

-0.68

Saudi Arab. 4

-1.31

0.15

Japan 4

1.91

0.54

Nigeria 3

-1.58

-0.68

Serbia 3

0.84

-1.05

Japan 5

1.96

-0.05

Nigeria 4

-1.53

0.28

Serbia 4

0.65

-1.03

Jordan 3

-1.46

-0.97

Norway 1

0.89

0.53

Serbia 5

0.35

-0.62

Jordan 4

-1.61

-1.05

Norway 2

1.17

0.79

Singapore

-0.54

-0.28

Kyrgyz 4

-0.15

-0.91

Norway 3

1.31

1.33

Slovakia 2

.075

-0.82

Latvia 2

1.21

-0.60

Norway 5

1.39

2.17

Slovakia 3

0.41

-0.27

Latvia 3
Latvia 4
Lithuania 2

1.33
0.72
0.68

-0.89
-1.27
-0.64

Pakistan 3
Pakistan 4
Peru 3

-1.39
-1.42
-1.26

-0.52
-1.25
-0.18

Slovakia 4
Slovenia 2
Slovenia 3

0.67
0.64
0.69

-0.43
-0.62
-0.04
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Table 3 (continued).
Trad

Self

Trad

Self

Trad

Self

Nation &

Rat

Surv

Nation &

Rat

Surv

Nation &

Rat

Surv

Wave

Values

Values

Wave

Values

Values

Wave

Values

Values

Lithuania 3

0.96

-1.45

Peru 4

-1.36

0.03

Slovenia 4

0.95

0.38

Lithuania 4

0.98

-1.00

Philipines 3

-1.38

-0.12

Slovenia 5

0.73

0.36

Luxemburg 4

0.42

1.13

Phillipines 4

-1.21

-0.11

Spain 1

-0.26

-0.52

Macedonia 3

0.31

-1.02

Poland 2

-0.81

-0.27

Spain 2

-0.06

0.20

Macedonia 4

0.12

-0.72

Poland 3

-0.47

-0.41

Spain 3

-0.37

0.47

Malaysia 5

-0.73

0.09

Poland 4

-0.43

-0.60

Spain 4

0.12

0.51

Mali 5

-1.25

-0.08

Poland 5

-0.78

-0.14

Spain 5

0.09

0.54

Malta 4

-1.53

-0.03

Portugal 2

-0.21

-0.43

Sweden 1

1.20

0.85

Mexico 1

-1.15

-0.26

Portugal 4

-0.90

0.49

Sweden 2

1.17

1.54

Mexico 2

-0.30

0.09

Puerto Rico 3

-2.01

0.81

Sweden 3

1.49

1.99

Mexico 3

-0.81

0.30

Puerto Rico 4

-2.07

1.12

Sweden 4

1.67

2.09

Mexico 4

-1.47

0.53

Romania 2

0.24

-1.18

Sweden 5

1.86

2.35

Mexico 5

-1.47

1.03

Romania 3

0.36

-1.26

Switzerland 2

0.19

1.11

Moldova 3

0.36

-1.91

Romania 4

-0.28

-1.60

Switzerland 3

0.82

1.35

Moldova 4

0.46

-1.69

Romania 5

-0.39

-1.55

Switzerland 5

0.74

1.90

Taiwan 3

0.66

-0.81

USA 2

-0.68

1.35

Taiwan 5

1.16

-1.18

USA 3

-0.89

1.62

Tanzania 4

-1.84

-0.15

USA 4

-0.52

1.59

Thailand 5

-0.64

0.01

USA 5

-0.81

1.76

Trinidad 5

-1.83

-0.26

Venezuela 3

-1.82

0.35

Turkey 2

-0.89

-0.17

Venezuela 4

-1.60

0.43

Turkey 3

-1.13

0.28

Vietnam 4

-0.68

0.22

Turkey 4

-0.86

-0.34

Vietnam 5

-0.30

-0.26

Turkey 5

-0.89

-0.33

W Germany 1

0.83

-0.07

Uganda 1

-1.42

-0.50

W Germany 2

1.23

0.69

Ukraine 3

0.84

-1.83

W Germany 3

1.55

1.52

Ukraine 4

0.90

-1.72

W Germany 5

1.31

0.74

Ukraine 5

0.30

-0.83

W Germany 4

1.17

0.44

Uruguay 3

-0.21

0.48

Zambia 5

-0.77

-0.62

Uruguay 5

-0.37

0.99

Zimbabwe 4

-1.50

-1.36

Source: Inglehart (2010)

Table 4 displays the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent
variables for the data used in the World Values Survey analysis. Shown are the number
of observations, minimum, maximum, mean, median, and standard deviation for each of
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the variables. Included in the data set are observations for 94 countries from the years
1990, 1995, 2000, and 2006.
Table 4
Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent and Independent Variables for the World
Values Survey Analysis

Variable

n

Minimum Maximum

Mean

Median

Standard
Deviation

Tax Effort
Gov Expenditures

191
191

1.21
1.70

76.38
76.92

21.71
22.71

15.15
16.94

17.55
17.25

Traditional vs. Rational
Survival vs. Self
Expression

251

-2.07

1.96

-0.02

0.09

1.01

251

-1.91

2.35

0.00

-0.08

0.99

GNI per capita
Population
Trade Openness
Parliamentary dummy

211
205
201
251

210
7.18
2.01
0.00

53,210 12,404
1321.85 84.82
250.60 40.58
1.00
0.49

8,230
22.93
32.05
0.00

10,953
217.16
34.00
0.50

Tax Effort and Government Expenditures are expressed as a percentage of GDP.
Population is reflected in the millions.
GNI per capita is reflected in U.S. dollars.

World Values Survey (Inglehart 2010) cultural dimensions are used in order to
confirm the results observed from the tests of the Hofstede (2001) cultural variables. The
objective of this portion of the paper is to test the hypothesis that certain characteristics of
a nation‘s culture affect its tax effort and the size of the governmental sector. More
specifically, to test the hypothesis that countries with high traditional versus secular
rational scores have high tax effort and government spending. An additional objective is
to test the hypothesis that countries with high survivalist versus self expression scores
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have high tax effort and government spending. Such results will confirm the theory
outlined in this paper.
Hypotheses related to the World Values Survey are as follows:
H8: There is not a relationship between Traditional versus Secular Rational values
and tax effort.
H9: There is a direct relationship between Traditional versus Secular Rational
values and tax effort.
H10: There is not a relationship between Survivalist versus Self Expression values
and tax effort.
H11: There is a direct relationship between Survivalist versus Self Expression
values and tax effort.
The basic econometric model which tests the relationship between World Values
Survey (2010) cultural variables and the size of government is as follows:
𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽₁𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽₂𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑣𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽₃𝐺𝑁𝐼 it + 𝛽₄𝑃𝑂𝑃it + 𝛽₅𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒it
+ 𝛽₆𝑃𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚it + 𝑢
Where:
Tax Effort is the size of the government as a percentage of gross domestic product.
TradRat is the Traditional versus Secular Rational country score.
SurvSelf is the Survivalist versus Self Expression country score.
GNI is the Gross National Income per capita expressed on a Purchasing Power Parity
basis.
POP is the nation‘s population in millions.
Trade is the Trade Openness (Exports plus Imports divided by GDP) of the country.
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ParDum is the Parliamentary Dummy, One if the country is governed by a
democratically elected Parliament, zero otherwise.
u represents unobserved factors which affect the size of government. u also includes the
error term.
t = 1,2,3,4 corresponding to the years 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2006.
i is the individual country observation.
A number of hypotheses related to the control variables used in the analysis are
also tested. Those hypotheses related to the other independent and control variables are
as follows:
H12: There is not a relationship between Gross National Income per capita and tax
effort.
H13: There is a direct relationship between Gross National Income per capita and
tax effort.
H14: There is not a relationship between Population and tax effort.
H15: There is a direct relationship between Population and tax effort.
H16: There is not a relationship between Trade Openness and tax effort.
H17: There is a direct relationship between Trade Openness and tax effort.
H18: There is not a relationship between being governed by a Parliamentary
Democracy and tax effort.
H19: There is a direct relationship between being governed by a Parliamentary
Democracy and tax effort.
Results of the hypotheses testing will be displayed and discussed in Chapter IV.
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CHAPTER IV
STATISTICAL METHODS AND RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS
Pooled least squares regression is utilized to empirically test the main hypotheses
of the study. Pooled least squares regression is appropriate whenever independently
sampled cross sections are obtained from large populations at different points in time
(Wooldridge 2006). Since the World Values Survey (2010) is conducted in such a
manner, pooled least squares is appropriate. World Values Surveys‘ (2010) were
conducted in the years 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2006. The surveys provide alternative
cultural measures which allow for testing to confirm results observed using the Hofstede
cultural measures. Accordingly, the Hofstede (2001) cultural dimensions are analyzed
utilizing the same methodology - pooled least squares covering the same time periods. In
other words, the dependent variable tax effort is regressed against Hofstede‘s cultural
dimensions and control variables with data from the years 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2006.
The first World Values Survey conducted in 1981 is excluded from this analysis
for two reasons. First, the survey covered only 24 countries and secondly there is a lack
of data availability for all countries with respect to the dependent variable as well as the
other control variables for 1981.
Note, the independent variables GNI per capita and population have been
transformed in order to avoid the use of scientific notation in the results tables. GNI per
capita has been divided by 100 while population has been reflected in the millions.
Pooled Regression Tax Effort Regressed on the Hofstede Variables
The model achieved an F score of 33.53 with a p-value of 0.0000. Overall the
independent and control variables explain about fifty nine and a half (59.5) percent of the
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variation in the level of tax effort with the adjusted R squared equal to 0.5946. Table 5
shows the coefficients, standard error, t value, and corresponding p-values for each of the
independent variables. As the results indicate there are strong associations between the
various independent variables and the dependent variable, tax effort. The result is
consistent with and supports the theories as outlined in the paper.
The basic econometric model which tests the relationship between Hofstede‘s
(2001) cultural variables and the size of government is as follows:
𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡 = 𝛽₀ + 𝛽₁𝐼𝑁𝐷i + 𝛽₂𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐶i + 𝛽₃𝑃𝐷i + 𝛽₄𝑈𝐴i + 𝛽₅𝐺𝑁𝐼it + 𝛽₆𝑃𝑂𝑃it
+ 𝛽₇𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒it + 𝛽₈𝑃𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚it + 𝑢
Where:
Tax Effort is the size of the government as a percentage of gross domestic product.
IND is the Individualism and Collectivist country score.
MASC is the Masculinity and Femininity country score.
PD is the Power Distance country score.
UA is the Uncertainty Avoidance country score.
GNI is the Gross National Income per capita expressed on a Purchasing Power Parity
basis.
POP is the nation‘s population in millions.
Trade is the Trade Openness (Exports plus Imports divided by GDP) of the country.
ParDum is the Parliamentary Dummy, one if the country is governed by a democratically
elected Parliament, zero otherwise.
u represents unobserved factors which affect tax effort. u also includes the error term.
t = 1,2,3,4 corresponding to the years 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2006.
i is the individual country observation.
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Results from the primary analysis are reflected in Table 5 below:
Table 5
Pooled Regression Tax Effort on Hofstede Cultural Variables
Variable
IND
MASC
PD
UA
GNIpercap
PopMil
TrOpen
Parliament
1995
2000
2006
Intercept
F score
Adj. R2
N = 245

Coef.
0.001163
-0.00186
-0.00042
.0000969
.0007256
-0.00015
-0.00027
0.063629
-0.08385
-0.12611
-0.05443
0.254546
33.53
0.5946

Std. Err.
0.000469
0.000395
0.000487
0.000376
.0001089
5.27E-05
0.000153
0.01702
0.020785
0.021125
0.023239
0.04951

T
2.48
-4.71
-0.87
0.26
6.67
-2.91
-1.78
3.74
-4.03
-5.97
-2.34
5.14

pvalues
0.014
0.000
0.385
0.797
0.000
0.004
0.077
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.020
0.000

**
*

*
*
***
*
*
*
**
*

*Statistically Significant at the 0.01 level.
** Statistically Significant at the 0.05 level.
*** Statistically Significant at the 0.10 level.

The dummy variables designated 1995, 2000, and 2006 are included in order to
allow the intercept to differ among time periods included in the pooled cross section. The
first year of the analysis, 1990, serves as the base year while subsequent years are
assigned a dummy variable corresponding to the year of the survey. Allowing the
intercept to differ among time periods reflects the fact that the population surveyed may
have different distributions in different years (Wooldridge 2006).
The regression is rerun and the coefficients calculated in order to gauge the
relative magnitude of the effect of each of the independent variables on the dependent

62
variable. Beta coefficients are obtained in order to determine the relative contribution of
the individual independent and control variables. Although statistical significance is
important, it does not reflect the whole story. According to Zilack and McClosky (2007,
2) blind adherence to statistical significance without regard to the magnitude of the effect
represents ―mathematical statistics gone terribly wrong.‖
Results from the Beta coefficients of the Hofstede cultural variables are reflected
in Table 6 below:
Table 6
Beta Coefficients of Tax Effort on Hofstede Cultural Variables
Beta
IND
MASC
PD
UA
GNIpercap
PopMil
TrOpen
Parliament
1995
2000
2006

0.1621422
-0.2012843
-0.0530845
0.0126235
0.4717299
-0.1359927
-0.0942896
0.1751273
-0.2058739
-0.3146831
-0.137193

Rank
6
4
10
11
1
8
9
5
3
2
7

As Table 6 indicates, among the variables of interest, masculinity, and femininity
has the largest affect. Only the control variable gross national income per capita has a
larger affect on tax effort than does the masculinity and femininity variable.
Individualism and collectivism also has a large affect; it has the next largest affect on the
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dependent variable. Accordingly, the results of the analysis are not only statistically
significant but meaningful as well.
Table 7 is a table of signs. It reflects both the predicted sign as well as the
observed sign after running the regression. As the table indicates, all of the variables of
interest are observed to have the predicted sign as well as three of the four control
variables. Trade openness is the sole exception; it was predicted to have a positive effect
on the dependent variable but was found to have a negative effect.
Table 7
Direction of Affects of the Independent and Control Variables on the Dependent
Variable for the Hofstede analysis

Predicted
Sign

Observed
Sign

Individualism and Collectivism
Masculinity and Femininity
Uncertainty Avoidance
Power Distance

+
+
-

+
+
-

GNI per capita
Population
Trade Openness
Parliamentary Democracy

+
+
+

+
+

Variable

All of the independent variables of interest are observed to have the predicted
sign. In other words, the direction of the affect is consistent with the hypotheses.
Further, three of the four control variables have the predicted sign as well, trade openness
being the sole exception. The same results hold true when governmental expenditures are
used as the dependent variable in place of tax effort: all of the variables of interest have
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the predicted sign and all but trade openness among the control variables have the
predicted sign. Signs of statistically insignificant coefficients are however, meaningless.
Pooled Regression Governmental Expenditures Regressed on the Hofstede Variables
The model achieves an F score of 29.28 with a p-value of 0.0000. Overall the
independent and control variables explain about fifty six (56) percent of the variation in
the level of tax effort with the adjusted R squared equal to 0.5604. Table 8 shows the
coefficients, standard error, t value, and corresponding p-value for each of the
independent variables. As the results indicate there are strong associations between the
various independent variables and the dependent variable, tax effort. The result is
consistent with and supports the theories as outlined in the paper.
Results from the analysis are reflected in Table 8 below:
Table 8
Pooled Regression Governmental Expenditures Regressed on the Hofstede Cultural
Variables

Variable

IND
MASC
PD
UA
GNIpercap
PopMil
TrOpen
Parliament
1995
2000
2006

Coef.

Std. Err.

0.001578
-0.00157
-0.00052
0.000719
6.22E-06
-0.00013
-0.00017
0.066532
-0.08169
-0.15242
-0.0847

0.000493
0.000415
0.000511
0.000395
1.14E-06
5.54E-05
0.000161
0.017888
0.021845
0.022202
0.024425

t

3.2
-3.8
-1.03
1.82
5.44
-2.26
-1.03
3.72
-3.74
-6.87
-3.47

p
values

0.002
0.000
0.306
0.070
0.000
0.025
0.303
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.001

*
*
***
*
**
*
*
*
*
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Table 8 (continued).
Variable

Coef.

Intercept
F score
Adj. R2
N = 245

Std. Err.

0.217007 0.052036
29.28
0.5604

t
4.17

p
values
0.000 *

*Statistically Significant at the 0.01 level.
** Statistically Significant at the 0.05 level.
*** Statistically Significant at the 0.10 level.

Table 9
Beta Coefficients Governmental Expenditures Regressed on Hofstede Cultural Variables
Beta

IND
MASC
PD
UA
GNIpercap
PopMil
TrOpen
Parliament
1995
2000
2006

0.2178715
-0.1688803
-0.0650687
0.0928475
0.400613
-0.1100848
-0.0569492
0.1814294
-0.1987126
-0.3768285
-0.2115197

Rank

3
7
10
9
1
8
11
6
5
2
4

As Table 9 indicates, among the variables of interest, individualism and
collectivism has the largest affect on the dependent variable. Only the control variable
gross national income per capita has a larger affect on governmental expenditures than
does the individualism and collectivism variable. The parliamentary democracy variable
and the masculinity and femininity variable also have large affects on the dependent
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variable. Accordingly, the results of the analysis are not only statistically significant but
meaningful as well.
Pooled Regression Tax Effort Regressed on the World Values Survey Variables
The model achieved an F score of 35.91 with a p-value of 0.0000. Overall the
independent and control variables explain nearly sixty three (63) percent of the variation
in the level of tax effort with the adjusted R squared equal to 0.6281. Table 10 shows the
coefficients, standard error, t value, and corresponding p-value for each of the
independent variables. As the results indicate there are strong associations between the
various independent variables and the dependent variable, tax effort. The result is
consistent with and supports the theories as outlined in the paper.
The basic econometric model which tests the relationship between World Values
Survey (2010) cultural variables and the size of government is as follows:
𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽₁𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽₂𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑣𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽₃𝐺𝑁𝐼 it + 𝛽₄𝑃𝑂𝑃it + 𝛽₅𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒it
+ 𝛽₆𝑃𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚it + 𝑢
Where:
Tax Effort is the size of the government as a percentage of gross domestic product.
TradRat is the Traditional versus Secular Rational country score.
SurvSelf is the Survivalist versus Self Expression country score.
GNI is the Gross National Income per capita expressed on a Purchasing Power Parity
basis.
POP is the nation‘s population in millions.
Trade is the Trade Openness (Exports plus Imports divided by GDP) of the country.
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ParDum is the Parliamentary Dummy, one if the country is governed by a democratically
elected Parliament, zero otherwise.
u represents unobserved factors which affect tax effort. u also includes the error term.
t = 1,2,3,4 corresponding to the years 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2006.
i is the individual country observation.
Results from the analysis are reflected in Table 10 below:
Table 10
Pooled Regression Tax Effort Regressed on the World Values Survey Cultural Variables
Variable
TradRational
SurvSelf
PopMill
Parliament
GNIpercap
TrOpen
1995
2000
2006
Intercept
F score
Adj. R2
N = 187

Coef.
0.029695
0.035416
-0.00015
0.061349
5.91E-06
-0.00028
-0.09
-0.10508
-0.05045
0.204251
35.91
0.6281

*Statistically Significant at the 0.01 level.
**Statistically Significant at the 0.05 level.
***Statistically Significant at the 0.10 level.

Std. Err.

T

0.011239
0.013102
4.76E-05
0.020952
1.39E-06
0.000197
0.025786
0.024414
0.02724
0.028264

2.64
2.7
-3.12
2.93
4.25
-1.44
-3.49
-4.3
-1.85
7.23

p
values
0.009
0.008
0.002
0.004
0.000
0.152
0.001
0.000
0.066
0.000

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
***
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Table 11
Beta Coefficients Tax Effort Regressed on the World Values Survey Variables
Beta

TradRational
SurvSelf
PopMill
Parliament
GNIpercap
TrOpen
1995
2000
2006

0.1706334
0.2007036
-0.1469154
0.1700956
0.374761
-0.0745561
-0.2073203
-0.284728
-0.1257962

Rank

5
4
7
6
1
9
3
2
8

As Table 11 indicates, among the variables of interest, survivalist versus self
expression values has the largest affect on tax effort. Only the control variable gross
national income per capita has a larger affect. The traditional versus secular rational
values variable and the parliamentary democracy variable also have large affects on the
dependent variable. Accordingly, the results of the analysis are not only statistically
significant but meaningful as well.
Table 12 is a table of signs. It reflects both the predicted sign as well as the
observed sign after running the regression with the World Values Survey cultural value
variables. As the table indicates, all of the variables of interest are observed to have the
predicted sign as well as three of the four control variables. Trade openness is the sole
exception; it was predicted to have a positive effect on the dependent variable but was
found to have a negative effect.

69
Table 12
Direction of Affects of the Independent and Control Variables on the Dependent
Variable for the World Values Survey Analysis

Predicted
Sign

Observed
Sign

Traditional versus Secular Rational
Survivalist versus Self Expressive

+
+

+
+

GNI per capita
Population
Trade Openness
Parliamentary Democracy

+
+
+

+
+

Variable

As with the Hofstede (2001) table of signs shown above, all of the independent
variables of interest in the World Values Survey analysis are observed to have the
predicted sign. In other words, the direction of the affect is consistent with the
hypotheses. Further, three of the four control variables also have the predicted sign as
well with trade openness being the sole exception. The same results hold true when
governmental expenditures are used as the dependent variable in place of tax effort: all of
the variables of interest have the predicted sign and all but trade openness among the
control variables have the predicted sign. Signs of statistically insignificant coefficients
are however, meaningless.
Pooled Regression Governmental Expenditures Regressed on the
World Values Survey Cultural Variables
The model achieved an F score of 35.50 with a p-value of 0.0000. Overall the
independent and control variables explain about sixty two and a half (62.5) percent of the
variation in the level of governmental expenditures with the adjusted R squared equal to
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0.6254. Table 13 shows the coefficients, standard error, t value, and corresponding pvalue of the independent variables. As the results indicate there are strong associations
between the various independent variables and the dependent variable, governmental
expenditures. The result is consistent with and supports the theories as outlined in the
paper.
Results from the analysis are reflected in Table 13 below:
Table 13
Pooled Regression Governmental Expenditures Regressed on the World Values Survey
Cultural Variables
Variable
TradRational
SurvSelf
PopMill
Parliament
GNIpercap
TrOpen
1995
2000
2006
Intercept
F score
Adj. R2
N = 187

Coefficient
0.0293168
0.034791
-0.0001379
0.0711295
5.35E-06
-0.0003082
-0.0868598
-0.1223351
-0.0762018
0.229337
35.50
0.6254

*Statistically Significant at the .01 level.
** Statistically Significant at the .05 level.
*** Statistically Significant at the .10 level.

Std. Err.

T

0.01108
0.012917
4.69E-05
0.020655
1.37E-06
0.000194
0.02542
0.024068
0.026854
0.027864

2.65
2.69
-2.94
3.44
3.90
-1.59
-3.42
-5.08
-2.84
8.23

p
values
0.009
0.008
0.004
0.001
0.000
0.114
0.001
0.000
0.005
0.000

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
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Table 14
Beta Coefficients Governmental Expenditures Regressed on the World Values Survey
Cultural Variables
Beta
TradRational
SurvSelf
PopMill
Parliament
GNIpercap
TrOpen
1995
2000
2006

Rank

0.1715217
0.2007432
-0.1389565
0.2007925
0.3451889
-0.0825763
-0.2037158
-0.3374883
-0.1934398

7
5
8
4
1
9
3
2
6

As Table 14 indicates, among the variables of interest, survivalist versus self
expression values has the largest affect on governmental expenditures. Only the control
variable gross national income per capita has a larger affect. The traditional versus
secular rational values variable and the parliamentary democracy variable also have large
affects on the dependent variable. Accordingly, the results of the analysis are not only
statistically significant but meaningful as well.
Supplemental Testing
Pooled least squares regression and hypothesis testing are dependent upon a
number of assumptions; accordingly, compliance with those assumptions is tested.
Included are tests for the non-normality of residuals. Additional tests are performed to
test for outliers, influential points, and leverage. Tests for heteroskedasticity of residuals,
multi-collinearity, and the linearity assumption are also conducted.
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Normality Testing
The first series of tests are conducted in order to test for normality of residuals.
Normality of residuals is not a requirement of regression, it is however a requirement of
valid hypothesis testing. If normality of residuals is lacking then the p values for the t
and F tests are not valid (Chen et al. 2003).
H0: The residuals are normally distributed.
H1: The residuals are not normally distributed.
Three graphical tests of normality are conducted. After the regression is run the
residuals are predicted. Then the three graphs are analyzed. The first compared Normal
density with the Kernel density estimate. The second and third graphs are the qnorm and
pnorm graphs. The qnorm is sensitive to non-normality near the tails and the pnorm is
sensitive to non-normality in the middle. All three graphs show some evidence of nonnormality of residuals.
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Figure 1. Comparison of Normal Density with the Kernal Density Estimate
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Next the Shaprio-Wilk W test for normality is performed. The p value of the test
is based on the assumption that that the distribution is normal. Given the results of the
test, a z value of 3.356 and a p value of 0.00040, the assumption that the distribution is
normal must be rejected. The S-Francia or Shapiro-Francia test also yields similar results
as does the skewness and kurtosis test for normality or sktest.
Based on the results of the Shaprio-Wilk W test, the S-Francia test and the sktest,
as well as the inspection of the three graphs, the Null hypothesis that the residuals are
normally distributed must be rejected.
Tests for Outliers, Influential Points, and Leverage
The next series of tests performed on the data are tests for outliers, influential
points, and leverage. Outliers are observations with large residuals. They can have a
large impact on the results of a regression.
H0: There are outliers which have too large an influence on the regression.
H1: There are no outliers which have too large an influence on the regression.
A visual inspection of a graph matrix was performed. The scatter graph showed
the relationship between the dependent variable and each of the ten independent
variables. Some outliers are observed, indicating a potential problem.
Next the Studentized Residual is calculated. This step is followed by a stem and
leaf display of the results. Several of the observations are of concern since they exceeded
the absolute value of two (Chen et al. 2003). Indeed, three observations are less than
negative two and eleven are greater than two. Additionally, three observations are
greater than three. Observations greater than the absolute value of three are of particular
concern according to Chen et al. (2003) The most extreme observation is 3.52 rounded.
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Figure 4. Stem and Leaf Display of Studentized Residuals. Potential outliers are shaded
in gray.
To determine the extent to which the outliers influence the regression, those
observations considered to be outliers are omitted and the regression rerun. Omitting the
outliers has little effect on the outcome. When the three most extreme observations are
omitted, those with residuals greater than three, the F score increases from 33.53 to
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36.47, both with p-values of 0.0000. The adjusted R2 increases from .5946 to .6181.
Further, all of the variables which are statistically significant before the outliers are
omitted are statistically significant afterword and at the same levels of significance.
Likewise when the 11 outliers with an absolute value greater than 2 are omitted,
there is little effect on the regression. The F score increases further to 38.53 with the pvalue remaining at 0.0000. The adjusted R2 also increases further to 0.6392. Finally, all
of the variables which are statistically significant before the outliers are omitted are
statistically significant afterword and at the same levels of significance with the exception
of trade openness which becomes statistically significant at the .05 level with the
omission of the outliers, rather than at the .10 level with the outliers included in the
regression. Changes in coefficients are displayed in Table 15.
Table 15
Coefficient Comparison

PD
IND
MASC
UA
1995
2000
2006
GNIpercap
PopMil
TrOpen
Parliament
Intercept

No
Exclusions

Outliers
Excluded

Influential
Points
Excluded

-0.0004237
0.0011632
-0.0018595
0.0000969
-0.0838549
-0.1261119
-0.0544287
0.0007256
-0.0001532
-0.0002724
0.0636291
0.2545455

-0.0000338
0.0012251
-0.0012879
0.0000813
-0.078752
-0.1132437
-0.0447221
0.0007373
-0.0001485
-0.0002813
0.052724
0.1862173

0.0001464
0.0009268
-0.001047
0.0000127
-0.0729733
-0.1116504
-0.0535657
0.0008425
-0.0001586
-0.0002285
0.0518097
0.1647928
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A test of leverage is then conducted looking for observations which have too great
an influence. Influential points are those observations which, if removed, would
substantially change the estimated coefficients. The test of leverage utilizes the
following cutoff formula for problems:
2𝑘 + 2
𝑛
where k is the number of predictor variables and n is the number of observations (Chen et
al. 2003).
In this analysis the calculation is (2*11 + 2)/245 which equals .097960. A total of twelve
observations have calculated leverage which exceeds the cutoff point. Accordingly, the
test of leverage also yields potential problems with the data.
Next, leverage is plotted against the residual squared and the graph inspected.
This is a test for both outliers and influential points. A number of observations are of
concern.
Finally, overall measures of influence are conducted, specifically Cook‘s D and
DFITS. Using the conventional cutoff of 4/n (Chen et al. 2003) or in our case 4/245 =
.016327, Cook‘s D results in 16 observations above the cutoff point. Likewise DFITS
𝑘

11

whose cutoff is the absolute value of 2 (𝑛 ) or in this case 2 (245 ) which equals
0.42378, yields 18 observations above the cutoff point.
To determine the extent to which the influential points affect the regression, those
observations identified by DFITS are omitted and the regression rerun. Omitting the
influential points has little effect on the regression. When the 18 influential points are
omitted, the F score increases from 33.53 to 40.41 and the p-value remains 0.0000.
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Likewise the adjusted R2 increases from .5946 to .6573. Further, all but one of the
variables which are statistically significant before the outliers are omitted, are statistically
significant afterword and at the same levels of significance. The exception is trade
openness which is statistically significant at the .10 level when all observations are
included in the regression and not statistically significant when the influential points are
omitted. Changes in coefficients are displayed in Table 15 above.
Based on the tests conducted, the Null hypothesis that there are outliers which
have too large an influence on the regression is not rejected.
Tests of Homoskedasticity of Residuals
The next three tests are conducted to test the homoskedasticity of residuals. One
of the assumptions of regression is that the error variance or the error term has the same
variance at any value of the independent variable (Wooldridge 2006).
H0: The variance of the residuals is heteroskedastic.
H1: The variance of the residuals is homoskedastic.
The first method is the graphical method where the residuals are graphed against
the fitted values. The reference line is set at y = 0. In other words, there should be no
pattern in the residuals if the variances are homoskedastic. Visual inspection of the graph
yields an apparent violation of the homoskedasticity assumption.
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Figure 5. Residuals versus Fitted (Predicted) Values
Next, two mathematical tests of heteroskedasticity are conducted. Both test the
null hypothesis that the variance of the residuals is homoskedastic. The BreuschPagan/Cook-Weisberg test of heteroskedasticity yields a chi2 value of 25.22 and a p value
of 0.0000, indicating a violation of the homoskedasticity assumption. Yielding a contrary
result is the Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test. For heteroskedasticity, the
test yields a chi2 value of 84.84 and a p value of 0.1093. The p value is only slightly
higher than necessary to result in a confirmed violation of the homoskedastic assumption.
Based on the apparent violation of the homoskedasticity assumption from the
visual inspection of the graph as well as the failure of the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg
test and the near failure of the Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test, the Null
hypothesis that the error variance is heteroskedastic is not rejected.
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Tests for Multi-Collinearity
Next the variance inflation factor or VIF is calculated in order to test for multicollinearity. When multi-collinearity of the independent variables exists; the coefficients
are unstable and the standard errors for the coefficients are inflated (Chen et al. 2003).
H0: Multi-collinearity among predictor variables exists.
H1: Multi-collinearity among predictor variables does not exist.
VIF values greater than 10 are problematic as are Tolerances, defined as 1/VIF
less than 0.1. Results of the tests indicated no multi-collinearity problem as all VIF‘s and
Tolerances are well within the acceptable range. Indeed, the highest total VIF is only
3.07 and the mean VIF 1.83. Accordingly, the Null hypothesis is rejected. In other
words no multi-collinearity problem exists.
Tests of the Linearity Assumption
Next a test of the linearity assumption is conducted by plotting the standardized
residuals against each of the 11 predictor variables. In any linear regression it is assumed
that the relationship between each of the independent variables and the dependent
variable is linear.
H0: The relationship between each of the independent variables and the
dependent variable is not linear.
H1: The relationship between each of the independent variables and the
dependent variable is linear.
Visual inspection of the 11 graphs yields no clear pattern of nonlinearity.
Accordingly the Null hypothesis is rejected and the alternative hypothesis accepted. In
other words, there is no problem with the linearity assumption.
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In the aggregate the tests of the data described above indicate that there are some
minor problems with the data. However, data sets with problems are frequent
occurrences and methods have been developed to overcome such problems. According
to researchers at UCLA (Chen et al. 2003) the use of Huber-White sandwich estimators
can adequately compensate for such minor errors in the data as lack of normality,
heteroskedasticity, outliers, leverage, and influential points. Accordingly the data is
utilized as is but the regression is performed using the robust option for estimating
standard errors. No outliers are omitted since they do not have a substantial effect on the
regression.
The tests of normality of residuals; outliers, influential points, and leverage;
heteroskedasticity; multi-collinearity, and of the linearity assumption are all conducted on
the Hofstede data. Similar results are obtained when the World Values Survey data is
tested.
Table 16
Robust Pooled Regression with Tax Effort Regressed on the Hofstede Cultural Variables

Variable
PD
IND
MASC
UA
1995
2000
2006
PopMil
Parliament
TrOpen

Coef.

Robust
Std. Error

T

-0.000424
0.0011632
-0.00186
0.0000969
-0.083855
-0.126112
-0.054429
-0.000153
0.0636291
-0.000272

0.0005311
0.0004663
0.000425
0.0003897
0.0216037
0.0205253
0.0236616
0.0000494
0.0167622
0.0001828

-0.80
2.49
-4.38
0.25
-3.88
-6.14
-2.30
-3.10
3.80
-1.49

p
values
0.426
0.013
0.000
0.804
0.000
0.000
0.022
0.002
0.000
0.137

**
*
*
*
**
*
*
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Table 16 (continued).

Variable
GNIpercap2
Intercept
F score
R2
N = 245

Coef.

Robust
Std. Error

0.0007256 0.0001328
0.2545455 0.0541304
33.84
0.6129

T
5.47
4.70

p
values
0.000 *
0.000 *

*Statistically Significant at the 0.01 level.
** Statistically Significant at the 0.05 level.
*** Statistically Significant at the 0.10 level.

Table 17
Robust Pooled Regression with Government Expenditures Regressed on the Hofstede
Cultural Variables

Variable
PD
IND
MASC
UA
1995
2000
2006
PopMil
Parliament
TrOpen
GNIpercap2
Intercept
F score
R2
N = 245
*Statistically Significant at the 0.01 level.
** Statistically Significant at the 0.05 level.
*** Statistically Significant at the 0.10 level.

Coef.
-0.000524
0.0015776
-0.001575
0.000719
-0.081691
-0.152423
-0.084697
-0.000125
0.0665324
-0.000166
0.000622
0.217007
35.88
0.5802

Robust
Std. Error

T

0.0005755
0.0005345
0.0004322
0.0004053
0.0243652
0.0215814
0.0247401
0.0000484
0.0177659
0.000178
0.0001211
0.0564577

-0.91
2.95
-3.64
1.77
-3.35
-7.06
-3.42
-2.59
3.74
-0.93
5.14
3.84

p
values
0.363
0.003
0.000
0.077
0.001
0.000
0.001
0.010
0.000
0.352
0.000
0.000

*
*
***
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
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Table 18
Robust Pooled Regression with Tax Effort Regressed on the World Values Survey
Cultural Variables

Variable
TradRational
SurvSelf
PopMill
Parliament
TrOpen
GNIpercap2
1995
2000
2006
Intercept
F score
R2
N = 187

Coef.
0.0296945
0.0354157
-0.000148
0.0613493
-0.000283
0.0005912
-0.090002
-0.105084
-0.050455
0.2042512
28.06
0.6461

Robust
Std. Error

T

0.0122269
0.0139419
0.000033
0.0174983
0.0002031
0.0001649
0.0304645
0.0284412
0.0285475
0.0314703

2.43
2.54
-4.49
3.51
-1.39
3.58
-2.95
-3.69
-1.77
6.49

p
values
0.016
0.012
0.000
0.001
0.165
0.000
0.004
0.000
0.079
0.000

**
**
*
*
*
*
*
*

*Statistically Significant at the 0.01 level.
** Statistically Significant at the 0.05 level.
*** Statistically Significant at the 0.10 level.

Table 19
Robust Pooled Regression with Government Expenditures Regressed on the World
Values Survey Cultural Variables.

Variable
TradRational
SurvSelf
PopMill
Parliament
TrOpen
GNIpercap2

Coef.

Robust
Std. Error

T

0.0293168
0.034791
-0.000138
0.0711295
-0.000308
0.0005348

0.0120794
0.013222
0.0000321
0.0176436
0.0001854
0.000134

2.43
2.63
-4.29
4.03
-1.66
3.99

p
values
0.016
0.009
0.000
0.000
0.098
0.000

**
*
*
*
***
*
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Table 19 (continued).

Variable

Coef.

1995
2000
2006
Intercept
F score
R2
N = 187

Robust
Std. Error

-0.08686 0.030639
-0.122335 0.0272471
-0.076202 0.028149
0.229337 0.0305507
36.63
0.6435

T
-2.83
-4.49
-2.71
7.51

p
values
0.005
0.000
0.007
0.000

*
*
*
*

*Statistically Significant at the 0.01 level.
** Statistically Significant at the 0.05 level.
*** Statistically Significant at the 0.10 level.

Evaluation of the Null and Alternative or Research Hypotheses
Ho: There is not a relationship between Individualism and Collectivism and tax
effort.
H1: There is a direct relationship between Individualism and Collectivism and tax
effort.
Pooled least squares regression finds a statistically significant relationship
between the individualism and collectivism cultural variable and tax effort. As Table 16
indicates the correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. Further, the relationship is
meaningful as evidenced by the Beta coefficients found in Table 6 and has the correct
sign as indicated by Table 7. Additionally, all of the results are confirmed when
governmental expenditures are substituted for tax effort as the dependent variable.
Indeed, as Table 17 indicates the correlation is statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
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Considering the robust statistical significance as well as the meaningfulness of the
results, the Null Hypotheses must be rejected and the alternative or research Hypotheses
accepted.
H2: There is not a relationship between Masculinity and Femininity and tax
effort.
H3: There is a direct relationship between Masculinity and Femininity and tax
effort.
Pooled least squares regression finds a statistically significant relationship
between the masculinity and femininity cultural variable and tax effort. As Table 16
indicates the correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. Further, the relationship is
meaningful as evidenced by the Beta coefficients found in Table 6 and has the correct
sign as indicated by Table 7. Additionally, all of the results are confirmed when
governmental expenditures are substituted for tax effort as the dependent variable.
Considering the robust statistical significance as well as the meaningfulness of the
results, the Null Hypotheses must be rejected and the alternative or research Hypotheses
accepted.
H4: There is not a relationship between Power Distance and tax effort.
H5: There is a direct relationship between Power Distance and tax effort.
Pooled least squares regression finds no statistically significant relationship
between the power distance cultural variable and tax effort. As Table 16 indicates the
correlation is not significant at any level. Further, the relationship is not very meaningful
as evidenced by the Beta coefficients found in Table 6, although the variable does have
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the correct sign as indicated by Table 7. Additionally, all of the results are confirmed
when governmental expenditures are substituted for tax effort as the dependent variable.
Considering the lack of statistical significance as well as the lack of
meaningfulness of the results, the Null Hypotheses is not rejected.
H6: There is not a relationship between Uncertainty Avoidance and tax effort.
H7: There is a direct relationship between Uncertainty Avoidance and tax effort.
Pooled least squares regression finds no statistically significant relationship
between the uncertainty avoidance cultural variable and tax effort. As Table 16 indicates
the correlation is not significant at any level. Further, the relationship is not very
meaningful as evidenced by the Beta coefficients found in Table 6, although the variable
does have the correct sign as indicated by Table 7. As Table 17 indicates, when
governmental expenditures are substituted for tax effort as the dependent variable, the
results are significantly significant at the .10 level. However, the result is still not very
meaningful as evidenced by the Beta coefficients found in Table 6.
Considering the lack of statistical significance as well as the lack of
meaningfulness of the results, the Null Hypotheses is not rejected.
H8: There is not a relationship between Traditional versus Secular Rational values
and tax effort.
H9: There is a direct relationship between Traditional versus Secular Rational
values and tax effort.
Pooled least squares regression finds a statistically significant relationship
between the traditional versus secular rational cultural variable and tax effort. As Table
18 indicates the correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. Further, the relationship is
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meaningful as evidenced by the Beta coefficients found in Table 11 and has the correct
sign as indicated by Table 12. Additionally, all of the results are confirmed when
governmental expenditures are substituted for tax effort as the dependent variable.
Considering the robust statistical significance as well as the meaningfulness of the
results, the Null Hypotheses must be rejected and the alternative or research Hypotheses
accepted.
H10: There is not a relationship between Survivalist versus Self Expression values
and tax effort.
H11: There is a direct relationship between Survivalist versus Self Expression
values and tax effort.
Pooled least squares regression finds a statistically significant relationship
between the survivalist versus self expression cultural variable and tax effort. As Table
18 indicates the correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. Further, the relationship is
meaningful as evidenced by the Beta coefficients found in Table 11 and has the correct
sign as indicated by Table 12. Additionally, all of the results are confirmed when
governmental expenditures are substituted for tax effort as the dependent variable.
Considering the robust statistical significance as well as the meaningfulness of the
results, the Null Hypotheses must be rejected and the alternative or research Hypotheses
accepted.
H12: There is not a relationship between Gross National Income per capita and tax
effort.
H13: There is a direct relationship between Gross National Income per capita and
tax effort.
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Pooled least squares regression finds a statistically significant relationship
between gross national income per capita and tax effort. As Table 16 indicates the
correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. Further, the relationship is meaningful as
evidenced by the Beta coefficients found in Table 6. Indeed gross national income per
capita has the largest effect of all the independent variable on the dependent variable.
Further, the variable has the correct sign as indicated by Table 7. All of the results are
confirmed when governmental expenditures are used as the dependent variable as
indicated by Tables 17 and 19. All of the results are further confirmed when World
Values Survey independent variables are used.
Considering the robust statistical significance as well as the meaningfulness of the
results, the Null Hypotheses must be rejected and the alternative or research Hypotheses
accepted.
H14: There is not a relationship between Population and tax effort.
H15: There is a direct relationship between Population and tax effort.
Pooled least squares regression finds a statistically significant relationship
between population and tax effort. As Table 16 indicates the correlation is significant at
the 0.01 level. Further, the relationship is meaningful as evidenced by the Beta
coefficients found in Table 6. Additionally, the variable has the correct sign as indicated
by Table 7. All of the results are confirmed when governmental expenditures are used as
the dependent variable as indicated by Tables 17 and 19. All of the results are further
confirmed when World Values Survey independent variables are used.
Considering the robust statistical significance as well as the meaningfulness of the
results, the Null Hypotheses must be rejected and the research Hypotheses accepted.
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H16: There is not a relationship between Trade Openness and tax effort.
H17: There is a direct relationship between Trade Openness and tax effort.
Pooled least squares regression finds no statistically significant relationship
between trade openness and tax effort. As Tables 16, 17, and 18 indicate the correlation
is not significant at any level. Only Table 19 indicates statistical significance at the 0.10
level. Further, the relationship is not very meaningful as evidenced by the Beta
coefficients found in Tables 6 and 11 and the variable has the wrong sign as indicated by
Table 7. When governmental expenditures are substituted for tax effort as the dependent
variable the relationship is not very meaningful as evidenced by Tables 9 and 14 and the
sign remains incorrect.
Considering the lack of statistical significance as well as the lack of
meaningfulness of the results and the wrong signs, the Null Hypotheses is not rejected.
H18: There is not a relationship between being governed by a Parliamentary
Democracy and tax effort.
H19: There is a direct relationship between being governed by a Parliamentary
Democracy and tax effort.
Pooled least squares regression finds a statistically significant relationship
between the parliament independent variable and tax effort. As Table 16 indicates the
correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. Further, the relationship is meaningful as
evidenced by the Beta coefficients found in Table 6. Indeed the parliament variable has
the third largest effect of all the independent variable on the dependent variable and the
variable has the correct sign as indicated by Table 7. All of the results are confirmed
when governmental expenditures are used as the dependent variable as indicated by
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Tables 17 and 19. All of the results are further confirmed when World Values Survey
independent variables are used.
Considering the robust statistical significance as well as the meaningfulness of the
results, the Null Hypotheses must be rejected and the research Hypotheses accepted.
Summary of Findings
The statistical analysis confirms the theory outlined in the paper that certain
national culture attributes affect tax effort. The Hofstede (2001) cultural attributes
individualism and collectivism and masculinity and femininity both are statistically
significant and meaningful when regressed on tax effort. Likewise the World Values
Survey‘s (2010) cultural attributes of traditional versus secular rational and survivalist
versus self expression are also both statistically significant and meaningful when
regressed on tax effort.
Additionally three out of four control variables are statistically significant when
regressed on tax effort. Population, gross national income per capita, and the existence of
a parliament are all statistically significant while trade openness is not. Likewise, the
Hofstede (2001) cultural dimensions of power distance and uncertainty avoidance lack
statistical significance.
The results are robust to changes in the measure of national culture utilized as
evidenced by the comparable results from the Hofstede (2001) variables and the World
Value Survey (2010) variables. The results are also robust to changes in the dependent
variable when governmental expenditure is substituted for tax effort. Finally, the results
are also robust to the inclusion or exclusion of outliers and influential points.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
As the results of the statistical analysis clearly indicate, cultural factors do indeed
play a role in determining a country‘s level of tax effort and the size of its government.
In other words, the cultural differences observed among countries provide a partial
explanation for the differences in aggregate tax levels and the size of governments.
Certain cultural attributes or dimensions, specifically Hofstede‘s (2001) individualism
and collectivism and masculinity and femininity as well as the World Values Survey‘s
(2010) traditional versus secular rational and survivalist versus self expression cultural
values, all have a statistically significant and meaningful affect on tax effort. As
predicted by the theory outlined in the paper, countries with high individualism and
collectivism scores have high tax effort and countries with low masculinity and
femininity scores also have high tax effort. Likewise countries with high scores on the
traditional versus secular rational cultural dimension have high tax effort and countries
with high levels on the survivalist versus self expression cultural value also have high tax
effort.
Contributions of This Research
This research contributes to the understanding of the differences among countries
in tax effort and the related size of the governmental sector. It adds to the list of factors
or determinants which affect tax effort and the size of government. This research
explains about sixty (60) percent of the variation observed in tax effort among countries,
after controlling for other known or theorized determinants.
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Limitations of this Research
There are a number of limitations and weaknesses to various aspects of this
analysis. There are limitations and weaknesses with respect to the data utilized in this
analysis. Tax effort, for example can be and is calculated in a number of different ways.
The same is true with government spending. Missing or incomplete data is a significant
problem whenever differences among countries are analyzed; this is especially true of
countries in the developing world. Although the survey data used to calculate the
national cultural scores may be complete, information on the control variables such as
GDP or trade openness may be estimates. Even in the highly developed United States
there are limitations with respect to population counts. Likewise, even a well understood
and widely used measure of national income like GDP or GNI suffers from a number of
limitations. Again, this is especially true of developing nations where often a majority of
economic activities are part of the transaction economy.
There are limitations with respect to Hofstede‘s (2001) cultural dimensions.
Baskerville (2003) objects to Hofstede‘s equating of culture with nation as well as his use
of numerical indices in an attempt to quantify and explain something as complex as
culture. Further Baskerville (2003) questions the ability of anyone outside of a culture
from understanding the culture. In other words, it takes a Frenchman to understand
French culture.
Like Baskerville (2003), McSweeney (2003) objects to Hofstede‘s cultural
dimensions on multiple grounds. He questions the existence of national culture and
doubts that something as elusive as culture can be operationalized. McSweeney (2003)
also questions the ability of a survey of the employees of one corporation being able to
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capture the information required to measure cultures of nations. It represents no more
than a narrow survey, according to McSweeney (2003), certainly not a national survey.
McSweeney (2003) also questions the ability of an outsider to gain a complete
understanding of another culture.
Hofstede (2001) appears to be aware of the limitations of his cultural dimensions.
Hofstede (2001) acknowledges, describes, and replies to many such critiques. Hofstede
(2001) addresses the critique that nations are not the best units of measurement for
studying culture. Most nations of the world are not monolithic single culture entities;
rather they are a complex mixture of overlapping multiple sub-cultures. However nations
exist and, according to Hofstede (2001) and others, they differ greatly in their underlying
cultures. Hofstede (2001) argues that a national culture is common to most members of a
nation, even those from markedly differing subcultures. Hofstede goes on to argue that
while nations may not be the optimal unit of measure, they are a useful measure. Nations
are particularly useful for cross country comparisons.
The next methodological critique Hofstede (2001) discusses is what can be
termed the generalization issue. It is not reasonable, critics argue, to generalize from a
survey of the employees of only one multinational firm to an entire nation. In other
words the IBM employees surveyed do not represent an accurate sample of the entire
nations from which they originate. IBM is a unique organization even among
multinational firms and it undertakes great effort to foster an IBM culture among its
worldwide employees. Hofstede (2001) counters that what he is measuring are
differences in cultural attributes. Granted IBM employees are not representative of the
nations from which they originate, however, IBM employees at all levels and from all
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departments of the organization are surveyed, everyone from grounds-keeping to
corporate executives are included in the surveys. While the IBM employees surveyed
may not constitute a representative sample of the nations from which they originate, those
employees retain certain national cultural attributes and it is those attributes which
Hofstede (2001) contends are being measured. The only difference among the groups of
employees from the various countries surveyed is nationality; in all other material
respects the employees are similar. Accordingly, the scores on Hofstede‘s (2001) cultural
dimensions should be an accurate reflection of the differences in national cultural
attributes.
The final critique Hofstede (2001) addresses is the age of the surveys. The IBM
employee surveys began in the late 1960‘s and many critics question the continuing
validity of such old data. Hofstede (2001) counters that argument by stating that survey
work continues and, further that national cultural attributes are remarkably stable over
time. Indeed, Hofstede (2001) maintains that many cultural distinctions among European
nations can be traced back to the Roman Empire. Further, there have been numerous
subsequent surveys by other researchers which have replicated the IBM results. In major
replication studies, Hoppe (1990), Shane (1995), Merritt (2000), Sondergaard (2002), van
Nimegen (2002), and de Mooij (2004) all confirm Hofstede‘s (2001) findings.
Additionally, many researchers in many different fields continue to use the cultural
dimensions and find them to be correlated with many economic and social phenomena.
In the final analysis, the quality of a measure of a societal cultural attribute is
dependent upon its usefulness. Is the measure statistically correlated with important
social, political, and economic phenomena? Are those correlations meaningful and does
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the measure provide explanatory and predictive power? If the answers to the above
questions are yes, then it is reasonable to assume that the measures of cultural attributes
are valid. The use of Hofstede‘s (2001) cultural dimension measures by other researchers
provides direct though limited support for their usage in this analysis.
The use of World Values Survey (2010) in the supplementary analysis mitigates
many of the limitations of the Hofstede (2001) data. This is especially true with respect
to criticisms regarding the narrowness of Hofstede‘s study as well as limitations with
respect to the age of the surveys.
Perhaps the most significant limitation of this research is the danger that rather
than national cultural attributes affecting tax effort, it could be some other unknown
factor which affects both national cultural attributes and tax effort. As with most
research in the social sciences, there are a large number of determinates which affect the
dependent variable, many of them unknown and perhaps even unknowable.
Areas of Further Study and Research
A number of areas of further research are suggested by this study. Both the
contributions of this research and the limitations of this research provide suggestions for
further study.
The first area of further research would be to continue the search for determinants
of tax effort. Although this study adds to the understanding of the differences in tax
effort among nations, some two fifths of the difference remains unexplained.
Another area of research could attempt to find correlations with respect to
national cultural attributes and the type of tax system a nation employs. Tax systems can
take on many different forms, utilizing different types of taxes as well as varying degrees
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of progressivity with respect to those taxes. Do certain national cultural attributes, for
example, lead to a greater reliance on income taxation or alternatively, consumption
taxation? Likewise, a further area of research could be an attempt to find correlations
with respect to national cultural attributes and the progressivity of the tax system. In
other words, do certain national cultural attributes lead to a more or less progressive tax
system?
Another area of study could be to analyze the effects of national cultural attributes
and their effect on the various components of government spending. Does culture affect
governmental education spending, for example? Or social welfare spending and transfer
payments? Or defense spending or spending on basic research and development? In
other words, is there any correlation with national cultural attributes and the major
categories of government spending?
Another area of future research could be looking at changes to the tax system of a
country over time and attempting to correlate those changes with national cultural
changes over the same time period. Such a time series analysis would require a long time
frame as national cultural attributes appear to change very slowly.
A final area of potential future research is that of optimal taxation. Optimal
taxation theory seeks to devise a system of taxation which maximizes the social welfare
of society (Slemrod 1990). It asks the question: What tax or system of taxes will raise
sufficient revenue for the government while leaving the society and its taxpayers as well
off as possible? Optimal taxation addresses an important question since different tax
systems vary greatly in their aggregate cost to society. Optimal taxation proponents
contend that a country‘s tax policy should be reflective of its unique socioeconomic

97
circumstances. Since economies and societies differ in important respects, so too should
their tax systems. In other words no two tax systems should be alike since no two
societies are alike. Likewise the optimal tax system of a society will change as
socioeconomic conditions change within the country. Finding a society‘s optimal tax
effort and optimal tax system is perhaps the highest goal of tax policy research.
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